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*Photograph: Signal Corps*

**SENATOR BENJAMIN F. WADE**  
*Chairman, Committee on the Conduct of the War*



# THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

*An Experiment in Civilian Control*

By T. Harry Williams

SENATOR James W. Grimes of Iowa arrived in Washington, November 5, 1861, for the second session of the thirty-seventh Congress, wearied with the long journey and convinced by conferences with other leaders of the "Radical Republican" faction that the administration of Abraham Lincoln was fast carrying the country and the party to destruction. "If the other Northwestern members feel as I do," he wrote his wife, "there will be something more during the coming session than growling and showing our teeth. And from what I hear, they do feel excited and incensed."<sup>1</sup>

The irate Iowa Senator expressed the disturbed feelings of the "Radical Republican" group. This segment of the party was more fiercely opposed to slavery than the other factions of the Republican coalition, and its chieftains saw in the outbreak of war a golden opportunity to destroy the institution. They proposed to accomplish this destruction by any method that promised success; but if a majority in Congress could be commanded, they preferred a drastic confiscation act. While laboring to achieve this necessary control of Congress, the Radicals supported a piecemeal system of emancipation to be effected by proclamations of freedom issued by generals in command of departments. Finally they hoped to force the President to issue a general edict freeing all slaves in the border states. Almost immediately the forces of Radicalism came into conflict with Lincoln, who was striving to hold together a coalition on the sole issue of preservation of the Union. The President stubbornly ignored the angry exhortations of the Radicals to formulate a policy which would guide the army in its treatment of fugitive slaves.<sup>2</sup> Early in December he aroused a storm of Radical denunciation by deleting from Secretary of War Simon Cameron's report a section that recommended the arming of slaves.<sup>3</sup> His message to Congress deprecated hasty, radical action and almost ignored the subject of emancipation.<sup>4</sup> Equally exasperating to the Radical

<sup>1</sup> Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, November 6, 1861, William Salter, *Life of James W. Grimes* (New York, 1876), p. 153.

<sup>2</sup> New York *Tribune*, October 28, 30, 1861; Thaddeus Stevens to his nephew, November 6, Thaddeus Stevens MSS. (in Library of Congress); *Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, p. 78, speech of Representative Eliot; General David Hunter to Lyman Trumbull, December 9, Lyman Trumbull MSS. (in Library of Congress).

<sup>3</sup> New York *Tribune*, December 4, 5, 10, editorial and Washington correspondence; *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, December 14; J. H. Bryant to Lyman Trumbull, December 5, Trumbull MSS. For the report, see *Senate Documents*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., II, no. 1.

<sup>4</sup> John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1905), VII, 28-60, Radical comments are given in New York *Tribune*, December 4; *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, December 4; Grant Goodrich to Lyman Trumbull, December 6, Trumbull MSS.; C. H. Ray to Trumbull, December 6, *ibid.*

cabal was Lincoln's administration of the army. The important commands, the major and brigadier generalships, were overwhelmingly held by known opponents of the anti-slavery movement. Generals George B. McClellan, Henry W. Halleck, Don Carlos Buell, and many others had expressed dissent with the aims of abolitionism. Such officers, complained the Radicals, would never use the army as an instrument to effect the freedom of the slaves.<sup>5</sup> The Radicals assailed them because they usually assisted slaveholders to recover fugitives who had escaped into the Union lines.<sup>6</sup> Lincoln had given only one important appointment to an officer with Radical antecedents: General John C. Frémont, erstwhile commander of the department of the West. But he overruled Frémont when the latter proclaimed the slaves in his department free, and later removed the general in what seemed to the Radicals an act of supreme injustice.<sup>7</sup> The Radicals believed that McClellan and his coterie of subordinates were in sympathy with the slaveholding South and hopeful that a compromise would make a resort to battle unnecessary. Thus they explained the inactivity of the Union armies. Visions of McClellan in the rôle of Cromwell, purging Congress of Republican members and restoring the Union at the point of the bayonet, haunted the Radical mind.<sup>8</sup> During the summer and autumn months of 1861 the Radical faction had relied on the inadequate weapon of public protest in its battle to force the administration into an anti-slavery position. But as the politicians gathered in Washington for the opening of Congress, the leaders were convinced that mere "growling and showing of

<sup>5</sup> Senator Henry Wilson, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, p. 164; Representative Conway, *ibid.*, p. 83; George W. Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions* (New York, 1872), pp. 202-204; J. W. Schaffer to Trumbull, December 24, Trumbull MSS.; S. Sawyer to Trumbull, December 18, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> For Radical denunciation of this procedure, see *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 33-34; for Representative Shellabarger's resolution condemning the offending generals, see *ibid.*, p. 8; Edward L. Pierce, *Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner* (Boston, 1894), IV, 166; New York *Tribune*, December 20; James Terrel to Trumbull, December 4, Trumbull MSS.; Emerson Etheridge to Andrew Johnson, December 19, Andrew Johnson MSS. (In Library of Congress).

<sup>7</sup> *Detroit Post and Tribune, Life of Zachariah Chandler* (Detroit, 1880), pp. 253-54, hereafter cited as *Life of Chandler*; Charles Sumner to Francis Lieber, September 17, 1861, Pierce, *Sumner*, IV, 42; Benjamin F. Wade to Zachariah Chandler, September 23, Zachariah Chandler MSS. (in Library of Congress); James W. Grimes to William P. Fessenden, September 19, Salter, *Grimes*, pp. 152-53; New York *Tribune*, September 16, 18, contain the Radical reactions to Lincoln's revocation of Frémont's proclamation. For Radical denunciation of the removal of Frémont, see Thaddeus Stevens, letter of November 5, Stevens MSS.; Gustave Koerner to Trumbull, November 18, Trumbull MSS.; Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, November 13, Salter, *Grimes*, pp. 154-55; O. J. Hollister, *Schuyler Colfax* (New York, 1886), p. 181. The Frémont-Radical connection is treated in T. Harry Williams, "Frémont and the Politicians," *Journal of the American Military History Foundation*, II (1938), 179-91.

<sup>8</sup> R. H. Kettler to Trumbull, December 22, Trumbull MSS.; J. W. Schaffer to Trumbull, December 24, *ibid.*; B. W. Reynolds to Trumbull, December 16, *ibid.*; Joseph Medill to Edwin M. Stanton, January 21, 1862, Edwin M. Stanton MSS. (in Library of Congress); speech of Senator Lane of Kansas, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 110-11; New York *Tribune*, December 14, 1861. Fears of a military dictatorship were intensified by injudicious remarks in the New York *Herald*, a McClellan organ, December 11.



teeth" must be abandoned. They sought to establish some Congressional agency which could delve into the recesses of army secrets and guide the party in the formulation of a war policy.

The obvious device was an investigative committee "to probe the sore spots to the bottom."<sup>9</sup> On December 5, Senator Zachariah Chandler, one of the leaders of western radicalism, moved the creation of a committee to determine the causes of the Union disasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff.<sup>10</sup> Immediately several Senators offered amendments to include other defeats. James H. Lane and Grimes wanted an investigation of Wilson's Creek to determine whether Frémont or the administration was responsible for the failure to reenforce Nathaniel Lyon at that battle. Grimes suggested a joint committee of both houses to inquire into the causes of all Union disasters yet sustained.<sup>11</sup> The discussion continued next day with Grimes defending his proposition that the proposed committee be general in scope rather than restricted to specific battles. William P. Fessenden saw an even more important function for it to fulfil, "to keep an anxious, watchful eye over all the executive agents who are carrying on the war at the direction of the people. . . . We are not under the command of the military of this country. They are under ours as a Congress." It would be futile, asserted John Sherman, to create an agency merely to investigate lost battles; let the committee probe into the "general conduct of the war," past, present, and future. Grimes altered his amendment to fit this proposal, and as finally passed it established a committee "to inquire into the conduct of the present war," with "power to send for persons and papers." Senator Henry Wilson was eminently satisfied with this change from the original resolution. He predicted the importance of the newly-born agency would derive not from its revelations of past mistakes but from its influence upon the future determination of war policies. "We should teach men in civil and military authority that the people expect that they will not make mistakes, and we shall not be easy with their errors."<sup>12</sup>

\* Grimes to W. P. Fessenden, November 13, Salter, *Grimes*, pp. 156-57.

<sup>10</sup> At the battle of Ball's Bluff, Colonel Edward Baker, United States Senator from Oregon and a Republican, was killed while leading the Federal forces. Radical critics blamed General Charles Stone, Baker's superior and McClellan's intimate, for Baker's death and the defeat. *New York Tribune*, October 26; J. W. Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, November 20, Salter, *Grimes*, pp. 153-54; Thaddeus Stevens to his nephew, November 5, Stevens MSS.; Sumner's eulogy of Baker, Pierce, *Sumner*, IV, 67. Representative Roscoe Conkling was the author of a House resolution requesting the Secretary of War to furnish information regarding Ball's Bluff, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 16-17.

<sup>12</sup> The resolution was adopted unanimously and without debate in the House. Two precedents for the Committee on the Conduct of the war existed. In 1791 a Congressional committee investigated the failure of General St. Clair's western expedition and presented a report exonerating him. *Annals of Congress*, 2 Cong., 1792, pp. 490-93, 602, 877, 895. The reverses of the American arms during the War of 1812 provoked a House investigative committee, but this body seems to have been inactive. *Ibid.*, 13 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 413-21. Grimes described these earlier agencies in his speech defending the creation of an investigative committee. *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 29-30.

The personnel of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, named by the Vice-president and the Speaker after conferences with the Radical leaders,<sup>13</sup> was preponderantly Radical. Senators Benjamin F. Wade, the chairman, and Chandler were leaders of the faction in the Senate. Three of the House members, George W. Julian of Indiana, John Covode of Pennsylvania, and Daniel Gooch of Massachusetts, belonged to the same faith. The Democratic Senate member was Andrew Johnson, perhaps the leading war Democrat in the country. Moses F. Odell of New York, the Democratic representative from the House, was also a zealous supporter of the war and an enemy of the peace Democracy. Wade, Chandler, Julian, Gooch, and Odell remained on the Committee for the full period of its three and one-half years' existence. Johnson, who took a prominent part in the work of the Committee, resigned early in 1862 to become military governor of Tennessee, and his three Democratic successors rarely attended a Committee meeting. Covode left Congress in 1864, and Benjamin F. Loan, a Missouri Radical, took his place on the Committee.<sup>14</sup>

When the Committee held its first meeting on December 20, an important experiment in the relations between the legislature and the executive, the civil and military authorities of a democracy at war, began. The guiding spirits of the Committee intended that it should be more than a mere fact-finding body. Chairman Wade envisioned it as a Congressional agency whose function was to insure the legislative branch of the government a voice in the conduct of the war and the determination of war policies. "We have gone forth in the spirit of the resolution that created us a committee," he said later, "to inquire into the manner in which this war has been conducted; to ascertain . . . wherein there was anything in which we could aid the administration in the prosecution of this war, and wherever there was a delinquency that we might ferret it out, apprise the administration of it, and demand a remedy."<sup>15</sup> Congress, he asserted, expected the Committee to obtain such facts as would be useful in determining the causes of military failure, "in order to apply any remedy that may be necessary."<sup>16</sup> This concept of its functions drew the Committee into frequent intercourse with the President and his administrative officers. As the inquisitors ascertained "the existence of malpractices, short-comings, and things inconsistent with the proper and beneficial conduct of the war," they sought interviews with Lincoln, the Secretary of War, and the Cabinet, disclosed their testimony, and "endeavored

<sup>13</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, p. 110; *Life of Chandler*, p. 216.

<sup>14</sup> With the beginning of a new Congress in December, 1863, the Committee was given a renewal of existence and more specific powers. Resolution of Thaddeus Stevens, *Cong. Globe*, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., pt. 1, p. 260.

<sup>15</sup> Benjamin F. Wade, *Traitors and their Sympathizers* (Washington, 1863), p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Wade to General Patterson during the Bull Run inquiry, *Reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, 1863, II, 78, hereafter cited as *C. C. W.* In its first report the Committee defined itself as an agency to "advise what mistakes had been made in the past and the proper course to pursue in the future." *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 4.





*Photograph: Signal Corps*

**SENATOR ZACHARIAH CHANDLER**

to work out a redress."<sup>17</sup> In the first days of the Committee's existence, this contact with the executive was fairly harmonious. But when Lincoln persisted in retaining McClellan in command over the protests of Wade and Chandler, the situation became more strained. By the summer of 1862 cordial cooperation had virtually ceased.<sup>18</sup>

With one member of the Cabinet, however, the Committee maintained continuous, confidential relations. This man was Edwin M. Stanton, who became Secretary of War in the first month of 1862 with the enthusiastic blessing and support of all the Radical leaders.<sup>19</sup> On the day that Stanton took office, the Committee tendered its services, "either individually or as a body." During the next few days the members and the new Secretary worked over the testimony which the Committee had gathered.<sup>20</sup> These cordial relations continued through the remainder of the war. Each member possessed a card admitting him to Stanton's office "at all times," and Wade and Chandler appeared there every morning. After taking important testimony, the Committee frequently adjourned to the White House, sent for Stanton, and read the evidence to him and the President. The Secretary and Wade would then unite in urging a particular recommendation upon Lincoln.<sup>21</sup> The Committee Radicals and Stanton were as one on the subject of emancipation, and the Secretary, with his knowledge of Cabinet decisions and his far-flung powers over the army, was an invaluable ally.

Although not a single member possessed either military experience or education, the Committee did not consider that this should preclude it from investigating army affairs or rendering judgments on the capabilities of military men.<sup>22</sup> Wade and Chandler, in common with many civilians of the 'sixties, felt a profound contempt for any claims that military science was a specialized, technical subject, mysterious to anyone not educated at West Point.<sup>23</sup> The former asserted that

<sup>17</sup> Wade, *Traitors and their Sympathizers*, p. 2. Sometimes the information was selected. See Chandler's speech, July 16, 1862, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 4, p. 3386. "The committee has been in constant, almost daily, communication with the administration, and has from time to time submitted such information as in their opinion should be furnished to the executive." For an account of a conference with Lincoln and the Cabinet, see *ibid.*, p. 3390.

<sup>18</sup> The 1863 report censured Lincoln for failing to maintain intercourse with the Committee. *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 4.

<sup>19</sup> R. B. Warden, *An Account of the Private Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (Cincinnati, 1874), pp. 400-401; Francis Fessenden, *Life and Public Services of William Pitt Fessenden* (Boston, 1907), pp. 230-31; John Cochrane, *War for the Union* (New York, 1875), p. 19; George W. Julian, *Political Recollections, 1840-1872* (Chicago, 1884), p. 204; Pierce, *Sumner*, IV, 63; *Life of Chandler*, p. 187; A. G. Riddle, *Benjamin F. Wade* (Cleveland, 1886), p. 316.

<sup>20</sup> *Journal of the Committee, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 83, 85; Julian, *Recollections*, p. 204.

<sup>21</sup> *Life of Chandler*, pp. 218-19; F. A. Flower, *Edwin McMasters Stanton* (Akron, 1905), pp. 137, 345.

<sup>22</sup> Wade's speech, *Cong. Globe*, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 2, p. 826.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 164-65.



the average American could easily make himself a master of military science in a short time.<sup>24</sup> Convinced that their opinions on military questions deserved as much consideration as those of any general, the members never hesitated to overrule the military men.<sup>25</sup> This was especially true when the Committee attempted to impose its concepts of correct military strategy upon the generals and the administration. The leading members had very positive ideas regarding the conduct of operations and continually urged the adoption of their plans upon the commanding officers. They believed that wars were won by fighting; their idea of action was perpetual attack. "In military movements delay is generally bad — indecision is almost always fatal," was the Committee's maxim.<sup>26</sup> If the enemy would not give battle on disadvantageous ground, Wade told McClellan, "push on the expedition until he would fight."<sup>27</sup> The Committee continually censured officers for taking precautionary measures to insure a safe retreat. The members feared that this indicated a lack of resolve to win battles and would result in hesitant, unsuccessful movements.<sup>28</sup>

The majority of the witnesses who testified before the Committee were necessarily officers of the army. The Committee realized that such men, engaged in active operations afield, could not hurry to Washington on receiving a summons. Consequently they permitted the men to fix their own time of attendance.<sup>29</sup> Many of these witnesses, products of West Point and the regular army, viewed the Committee as a meddling civilian agency and objected to supplying it with information of a purely military nature. This was most marked when the Committee sought to induce generals to disclose their future plans, to lift the veil of military secrecy.<sup>30</sup> When the investigators failed to get this information from the commanding generals, they endeavored to secure it from subordinate

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., pt. 1, p. 326.

<sup>25</sup> See Benjamin F. Wade, *Facts for the People* (Cincinnati, 1864), p. 3; *Journal of the Committee, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 86-88. For example of the Committee setting its opinion on the feasibility of organizing the army into corps against the opinion of McClellan, see Julian, *Recollections*, pp. 204-205.

<sup>26</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 62-63.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, II, 262, "Ball's Bluff."

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 700; Wade, *Facts for the People*, p. 2; *Life of Chandler*, pp. 225-26.

<sup>29</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 68; III, 3. The summons usually went to the officer concerned through the medium of the War Department. *New York Tribune*, March 29, 1865. In 1865 Generals Sherman and Weitzel resisted a summons on the ground that they could not leave their command. The Committee transmitted a resolution to Stanton asking him to issue "peremptory orders" to the two officers to appear before the committee. *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1865, I, xxxviii. The Committee did not gather all its testimony in Washington. The Committee or delegated sub-committees often traveled to the scene of operations and took evidence on the spot. In the course of their work, they went to Alexandria, City Point, Fortress Monroe, Centreville, Falmouth, and Petersburg in Virginia; New York City; Baltimore; Annapolis; Boston; Mound City and Cairo, Illinois; Columbus, Kentucky; and Memphis and Ft. Pillow, Tennessee. At Falmouth and Petersburg they appeared in the Union camp immediately after a battle.

<sup>30</sup> The desire of the radicals to make McClellan reveal his plans was one of the reasons for the creation of the Committee. Julian, *Recollections*, p. 201.

officers. The army, insisted Wade, had no right to withhold secrets from Congress.<sup>31</sup> The military recoiled from such questions. Not only did the soldier deem it dangerous to reveal proposed movements to a wide number of persons, but his training inhibited him from discussing the plans of his superior with a civilian body. Generals Fitz-John Porter and Charles Stone refused to do so on the ground that they would be violating army regulations.<sup>32</sup> The Committee met the same reaction when it asked military witnesses to discuss and criticize the actions and decisions of other officers. Since the members were determined to probe the secrets of army administration, it seemed perfectly natural to them that they should collect the opinions of all army witnesses, regardless of rank. Consequently they encouraged subordinates to speak freely of the actions of their superiors, to give opinions about battles they had not seen, and to say what they would have done had they been present on a certain field.<sup>33</sup> For a subordinate to criticize his superior was heresy to the military creed and dangerous for the subordinate; hence many refused to answer. Such actions always disgusted the civilians of the Committee who could not see that an "independent opinion" was destructive of military discipline.<sup>34</sup>

The officers who refused to furnish the Committee with the desired testimony were younger men closely associated with General McClellan. They owed their high place in the army to McClellan, opposed emancipation as a war policy, and heartily disliked the Committee. Other regular army officers—Keys, Heintzelman, Hooker, Barnard—leaned toward the Committee in politics and believed resentfully that McClellan and his conservative successors had purposely slighted them in the matter of promotions. This faction maintained close relations with the Committee, furnished opinions freely in testimony and private letters, and were highly critical of their superiors.<sup>35</sup> Officers who had entered the army from civilian life, such as Butler, Wallace, and Frémont, found that their philosophy coincided perfectly with that of the Committee; these men readily supplied any testimony the inquisitors wanted.<sup>36</sup> Because of its power over promotions, shrewd witnesses, whatever their background, gave the Committee the evidence it was after and played up to its radicalism. The Committee kept a check-list of the political opinions of officers,<sup>37</sup> and men who had spoken out against emanci-

<sup>31</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 122, 129-30, 179.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 171-72; II, 266-67, "Ball's Bluff."

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, II, 313, 316-17, "Ball's Bluff"; *ibid.*, II, 76, 150, "Bull Run"; *ibid.*, 1865, II, 31, 65, "Red River."


<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, II, 275, "Ball's Bluff."

<sup>35</sup> Heintzelman's testimony, *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 118-21, 346-59; Keyes, *ibid.*, I, 600-14; Hooker, *ibid.*, I, 575-80; Diary of Samuel P. Heintzelman, MS. (in Library of Congress), entries of December 24, 28, 1861; Joseph Hooker to Chandler, December 19, 1864, Chandler MSS.; E. D. Keyes to Stanton, October 27, 1862, Stanton MSS.; John Barnard to Stanton, January 15, 1863, *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Benjamin F. Butler, *C. C. W.*, 1863, 285-87; Lew Wallace, *ibid.*, III, 349-52.

<sup>37</sup> S. M. Allen to Benjamin F. Butler, May 26, 1890, *Private and Official Correspondence of Benjamin F. Butler During the Period of the Civil War* (privately issued, 1917), II,





*Photographs: Signal Corps*

**HOUSE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE**

*Hon. George W. Julian*

*Hon. Daniel Gooch*

*Hon. Moses F. Odell*

pation found the powerful influence of Wade and Chandler holding back Senate confirmation of an advanced commission.<sup>39</sup>

Certain rules of the Committee's procedure and its incessant attempts to secure the removal or subordination of officers opposed to the Radical war policies caused contemporary and later critics to label it a Court of Star Chamber, an Aulic Council, an Inquisition conducting military trials.<sup>40</sup> At the first meeting the Committee decided that all hearings would be secret, and the members swore not to reveal any information given by witnesses.<sup>41</sup> Enemies of the agency charged that it habitually violated its own restriction,<sup>42</sup> but Wade indignantly repelled such insinuations.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, the Committee's secret information often and purposely reached the desired audience. In the course of an investigation designed to rehabilitate the military reputation of General Frémont, Wade revealed the results of the investigation to the general's foremost journalistic champion, Charles A. Dana of the *New York Tribune*, and urged the editor to work for Frémont's restoration.<sup>44</sup> Again in July, 1862, the Committee amended its rule by permitting members to present its testimony in Congressional speeches. This was to enable Chandler to deliver a philippic against McClellan, defeated in the Peninsula and on the verge of removal.<sup>45</sup> The secrecy regulation invested the Committee with features unlike those of other investigative bodies. A witness appeared alone in the Committee room. He did not know whether previous witnesses had impugned his conduct or what charges the Committee might bring against him in a report to Lincoln. Thus the results of an inquiry in 1862 convinced the Committee that General Stone, a McClellan intimate, was guilty of treasonable relations with the enemy. But when Stone testified, Wade refused to acquaint him with the nature of the indictments against him, and the officer

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595. Allen claimed to have been an investigator or "scout" working without pay for the Committee. See also *New York Tribune*, December 24, 1862, p. 1, Army of Potomac correspondence.

<sup>39</sup> Colonel W. B. Hazen to John Sherman, December 10, 1862, John Sherman MSS. (in Library of Congress); *New York Tribune*, January 26, 1863, Army of Potomac correspondence; George Meade, *Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade* (New York, 1913), I, 324; *Detroit Free Press*, April 7, 1863; *New York World*, September 5, 1864.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Michie, *George B. McClellan* (New York, 1901), p. 165; William Swinton, *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac* (New York, 1882), p. 89; Sir Frederick Maurice, *Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War* (Boston, 1926), p. 68; Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, *The Science of War* (London, 1906), pp. 13-14, 18, 212; W. H. Hurlburt, *General McClellan and the Conduct of the War* (New York, 1864), p. 160; James Joy, "The Committee on the Conduct of the War," *Detroit Free Press*, January 10, 1863.

<sup>41</sup> *Journal*, C. C. W., 1863, I, 68. It was expected that the witness would maintain the same silence. *Ibid.*, 1863, II, 78, "Bull Run." The Committee reserved the right to lay vital testimony before the President and the Cabinet. *Ibid.*, 1863, II, 431, "Ball's Bluff."

<sup>42</sup> *Detroit Free Press*, January 10, 1863; *New York World*, April 13, 1863.

<sup>43</sup> Wade, *Traitors and their Sympathizers*, p. 2; C. C. W., 1863, II, 431, "Ball's Bluff"; *ibid.*, 1865, I, 99.

<sup>44</sup> Wade to Charles A. Dana, February 3, 1862, Charles A. Dana MSS. (in Library of Congress).

<sup>45</sup> *Journal*, C. C. W., 1863, I, 100-102; *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 4, pp. 3386-92; *Life of Chandler*, pp. 228-38; Chandler to Mrs. Chandler, July 6, 11, 1862, Chandler MSS.



was forced to make a general and inadequate defence.<sup>45</sup> On another occasion the Committee collected a mass of evidence to prove that General Meade was not responsible for the victory at Gettysburg. Meade himself finally appeared as a witness and found only Wade awaiting him.<sup>46</sup> The chairman lulled the suspicious general by telling him that the Committee was compiling a history of the war and wanted his contribution.<sup>47</sup> As a result Meade was unable to make any specific refutations of previous criticisms.

The Committee, despite the secret hearing and the sinister epithets of its assailants, was not a court. It possessed no judicial powers and could not pass a sentence. Rather it was a grand jury. The Committee, Wade said, rendered no final judgments on military men. "We only state what in our opinion tends to impeach them . . . and then leave it to better judges to decide."<sup>48</sup> When the Committee decided to seek the downfall of a particular officer, because of his suspected sympathy for slavery or a failure to achieve victories, the members began to collect evidence to accomplish their purpose. This labor completed, they would submit their findings to Lincoln and demand that the offending general be dismissed. If the President demurred, they threatened to arouse Congress and public opinion against him, to make their testimony public, "with," as Wade said on one occasion, "such comments as the circumstances of the case seemed to require."<sup>49</sup> If the pressure of the Committee failed to move Lincoln, as was sometimes the case, the members strove to weaken the forces of the intended victim and waited for the publication of their report ultimately to blast his reputation and usefulness. The same procedure, with certain necessary variations, was followed when the Committee was attempting to secure the advancement or prevent the removal of an officer who believed in the Radical war aims. In the famous case of General Stone, whom the Committee suspected of treason, the investigation resulted in a military arrest. Wade gave Stanton the damaging testimony and privately told him the general should be arrested. Stanton was eager to pull down a McClellan favorite, Lincoln was afraid to oppose the Committee, and the unfortunate Stone went to Fort Lafayette.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>45</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, II, 426-33, "Ball's Bluff." Stone testified again in February, 1863. This time he had read the previous testimony and could answer specifically the charges of hostile witnesses. The astonished Wade asked, "Why did you not give us these explanations when you were here before?" Stone replied, "Because the Committee did not state to me the particular cases . . . I gave general answers to general allegations." *Ibid.*, II, 492-96.

<sup>46</sup> The Committee had ruled that for the purpose of taking testimony a quorum was not necessary. This enabled one or two Republican members to examine witnesses at any time. People answering a summons would frequently find only Wade and Chandler present. *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 71.

<sup>47</sup> George G. Meade to Mrs. Meade, March 6, 1864, Meade, *Meade*, II, 169; *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, 329-51.

<sup>48</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, II, 426-33, "Ball's Bluff."

<sup>49</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1865, I, xix.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 74, 79; II, 17-18, 504-505, 509-10, "Ball's Bluff." Wade's speech on the

The Committee, with a concept of itself as a policy-forming agency and a determination to control the military machine for the furtherance of Radical principles, began its career profoundly impressed that a dangerous crisis threatened the nation and believing that the outcome depended largely on the success of its activities.<sup>51</sup> The members turned their attention at once to the inactive Army of the Potomac. They summoned numerous generals, and questioned them as to McClellan's plans, his secrecy of counsel, and his reason for not fighting.<sup>52</sup> The generals were told that Congress and the country wanted the army to undertake an offensive movement.<sup>53</sup> The Committee became convinced that McClellan was trying to protract the war until a wearied nation recalled the Democratic party to effect reunion,<sup>54</sup> and the leading spirits resolved on an appeal to Lincoln. On January 6, 1862, the Committee met the President and his Cabinet in a long, stormy interview. Wade demanded that Lincoln order McClellan to advance and fight, but the Cabinet, with the exception of Salmon P. Chase, condemned this proposal. The chairman bitterly condemned McClellan's generalship and urged Lincoln to conduct the war on "radical" principles.<sup>55</sup> A week later McClellan met the Committee in an off-the-record conference, and Wade and Chandler vainly exhorted him to strike a blow at the Confederates.<sup>56</sup> Balked in its effort to prod the army into action, the Committee enlisted the aid of Stanton. A series of conferences, during which the Committee disclosed much of its testimony,<sup>57</sup> resulted in a united effort of the Secretary and the Committee upon Lincoln. The latter yielded and issued his three orders of January 27 calling for a general advance of the armies on Washington's birthday.<sup>58</sup> McClellan so protested the order, however, that it was never carried into execution. This resulted in renewed pressure of the Committee and Stanton upon the general,<sup>59</sup> and finally the former bluntly informed Lincoln that unless the army moved it would offer a resolution in Congress

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Committee's part in the arrest of Stone, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 2, pp. 1666-68, 1735-37. Wade, *Traitors and their Sympathizers*; the title of this pamphlet refers to Stone and his Congressional supporters.

<sup>51</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, 111.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 1863, I, 113-16, 122-30, 165-68.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 128, 142, 159.

<sup>54</sup> Wade, *Facts for the People*, pp. 2, 6; Julian, *Recollections*, pp. 203-204.

<sup>55</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 72-73; Julian, *Recollections*, pp. 201-203; Chandler's account, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 4; *Life of Chandler*, p. 225.

<sup>56</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 75; *Harper's Weekly*, February 1, 1862; Joy in *Detroit Free Press*, January 10, 1863; *Life of Chandler*, pp. 225-26; Wade, *Facts for the People*, p. 2. The conference was held January 15.

<sup>57</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 85; Julian, *Recollections*, p. 204. See also Stanton to Dana, January 24, 1862, Dana MSS., promising that the eastern army would be forced to move.

<sup>58</sup> *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. I, vol. V, p. 41, hereafter cited as O. R.; Stanton to Wade, January 27, Stanton MSS.; Maurice, *Statesman and Soldiers*, pp. 68-69; Flower, Stanton, pp. 138-39; H. J. Raymond, *Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1866), p. 265.

<sup>59</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 84-86.



directing Lincoln to instruct McClellan to advance.<sup>60</sup> The President promised to hurry McClellan on and at the same time yielded to another Committee demand by organizing the Army of the Potomac into corps. This was a bold attempt to weaken McClellan's authority. The generals commanding divisions fell into two groups: the senior officers who did not owe their position to McClellan and who tended to agree with the Committee politically, and the younger, conservative generals who owed their place to McClellan's favor.<sup>61</sup> If the twelve divisions were arranged in corps, the senior, radical officers would receive the new rank of corps commanders, and McClellan's authority would be divided among a council of his enemies.<sup>62</sup> For a month the Committee pressed Lincoln to take this step, and on the eve of McClellan's spring campaign the President issued the order.<sup>63</sup>

After this victory the Committee rested until McClellan took his army to the Peninsula to attack Richmond from the east. Lincoln had always feared this procedure would leave Washington open to capture, and after the general's departure the Radicals dinned into his ears that McClellan had purposely left the capital defenseless. On April 2, General Wadsworth, the commander of the Washington defences, appeared at the War Department and asserted that the forces under his command were inadequate to defend the city.<sup>64</sup> Stanton, following what seems a course of action concerted with Wade, dispatched Wadsworth's report to the Committee. Wadsworth met the Committee the next day, repeated his charges, and indulged in a general excoriation of McClellan's generalship.<sup>65</sup> The Committee, Stanton, and Wadsworth then descended upon Lincoln and convinced him that the city lay helpless before the Confederates. They demanded that he detach a corps from McClellan's army to augment the defending forces, and the alarmed President ordered McDowell, then embarking his troops for the Peninsula, to remain in front of Washington.<sup>66</sup> The Radicals themselves were under no delusion that a "Rebel" force might suddenly capture Washington.<sup>67</sup> Rather it was their hope that while McClellan was engaged in the Penin-

<sup>60</sup> *Life of Chandler*, pp. 227-28.

<sup>61</sup> See General E. D. Keyes to Stanton, May 13, 1862, Stanton MSS., for an analysis by a Radical officer of the political differences of the two factions and the effect upon promotions; Governor William Sprague before the Committee, *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 536; Chase diary, October 6, 1862, Warden, *Chase*, pp. 498-99; New York *Independent*, May 26, 1864.

<sup>62</sup> General McDowell, a Committee favorite who would be one of the corps commanders, told Heintzelman that this was the Committee's purpose. Heintzelman diary, February 21, 1862.

<sup>63</sup> *O. R.*, ser. I, vol. V, p. 18; *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 86-88; Julian, *Recollections*, pp. 204-205.

<sup>64</sup> Wadsworth's report, April 2, Stanton MSS.; H. G. Pearson, *James A. Wadsworth of Genesee* (New York, 1913), pp. 118-20.

<sup>65</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 251-53.

<sup>66</sup> *O. R.*, ser. I, vol. XIV, p. 66; New York *World*, May 3, 1862, January 19, 1863; New York *Herald*, April 27, 1862, January 19, 1863; Joy in *Detroit Free Press*, January 10, 1863; speech of Senator Harris, April 14, 1862, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, p. 1653.

<sup>67</sup> Chase to T. M. Key, April 18, 1862, J. W. Schuckers, *Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (New York, 1874), p. 434; Grimes to Mrs. Grimes, May 22, Salter, *Grimes*, p. 197; P. C. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, to Stanton, May 8, 9, Stanton MSS.

sula, McDowell, a Radical officer, could achieve the honor of capturing Richmond.<sup>68</sup> Neither officer was destined to achieve this objective. McClellan's weakened army met defeat in the Virginia swamps, and McDowell remained near the capital.

When the news of McClellan's failure reached Washington, the Committee sprang into action. General John Pope, destined to succeed McClellan with the aid of the Radicals, appeared before the agency, denounced McClellan's conduct of the campaign, proposed a counter plan of his own, and delighted the members with his obvious radicalism.<sup>69</sup> A few days later the Republicans of the Committee, in a meeting unknown to the Democratic members, lifted the secrecy injunction in order to let Chandler use the records for a Senate attack on McClellan. The Michigan senator's speech, a blistering review of the general's command of the army, was a Radical manifesto.<sup>70</sup> The President, moved by impatience with McClellan and by the Radical pressure, ordered the bulk of the general's army transferred to Pope's command. The jubilation of the Committee at this victory was short-lived. Pope suffered a crushing defeat at Manassas, caused, said Chandler, by McClellan's treasonable refusal to offer him proper support.<sup>71</sup> To the great disgust of the Radicals, Lincoln again gave the command to McClellan, but the general's dilatory pursuit of Lee after Antietam moved the President to retire him from active duty. The Committee was pleased with his removal and could claim that its pressure and protests had contributed largely to his downfall.

The President, however, dashed the Radical hopes of controlling the army by giving the command of the eastern army to McClellan's trusted friend, Ambrose Burnside. In December, 1862, the new commander hurled his troops against those of Lee at Fredericksburg and recoiled with terrific slaughter. Immediately a Senate resolution directed the Committee to inquire into the causes of the disaster and to verify rumors that Burnside's subordinates had conspired to effect his defeat.<sup>72</sup> Four of the leading members repaired to the camp of the army at Falmouth, where they remained for two days gathering testimony. Burnside, on whom the wrath of the Committee might have been expected to fall, won its support by reversing his political beliefs. He told the gratified members that slavery should be destroyed and that he had labored to inspire other officers with a hatred of the institution.<sup>73</sup> The Committee then singled out William B. Franklin, commander of the left wing at the recent battle, as the scapegoat. Wade and Chandler indicated by their questions to witnesses that they intended to fix the

<sup>68</sup> Chase to McDowell, May 14, 1862, Schuckers, *Chase*, p. 495; Stanton to H. Dyer, May 13, Stanton MSS.; McDowell to Stanton, May 9, *ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 276; Wade, *Facts for the People*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>70</sup> *Journal, C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 102; *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 4, pp. 3386-92; *Life of Chandler*, pp. 229-38; Zachariah Chandler, *The Conduct of the War* (Washington, 1862).

<sup>71</sup> Chandler to Trumbull, September 10, 1862, Trumbull MSS.

<sup>72</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 643.

<sup>73</sup> Julian, *Recollections*, p. 225; Julian, *Select Speeches* (Cincinnati, 1867), p. 33.



onus upon this supporter of McClellan.<sup>74</sup> Upon returning to Washington, the Committee submitted the testimony to the Senate with no comments, but the Radical press used it to whitewash Burnside.<sup>75</sup> Burnside resigned shortly afterwards, disgusted by the intrigues of subordinates to secure his place, and the Committee enlarged its investigation of his direction of the army.<sup>76</sup> In its report it censured Franklin for not attacking in full force at Fredericksburg and blamed him for the defeat.<sup>77</sup>

As Burnside's successor Lincoln appointed the radical Joseph Hooker, considered by the Committee to be the ablest man in the army.<sup>78</sup> This pleased the Committee, although the Radical spirits felt that there were still too many conservative officers in the army.<sup>79</sup> When Hooker was defeated at Chancellorsville, the Committee refused to follow its usual course of making an investigation. Wade and Chandler came down to the camp at Falmouth to conduct an unofficial inquiry. On their return they loudly proclaimed that the army was in fine condition and waiting to be led to victory by Hooker.<sup>80</sup> The latter, however, faced by intrigues among his corps commanders similar to those he had once instigated against Burnside, soon asked to be relieved from command. The Committee investigated his tenure of command and concluded that his conservative subordinates had distrusted him because of his affiliation with the Radical faction and his support of an emancipation policy.<sup>81</sup> In its report the Committee censured the administration for not giving Hooker proper support at Chancellorsville.<sup>82</sup>

In choosing a general to take the place of Hooker, Lincoln decided on George G. Meade, a conservative McClellan officer.<sup>83</sup> The new commander's victory at Gettysburg saved him from a Committee attack, although the Radical leaders sneered at him as another McClellan, slow and dilatory.<sup>84</sup> In Washington the

<sup>74</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 655, 661, 670; Cochrane, *War for the Union*, p. 40; Meade to Mrs. Meade, December 20, 1862, Meade, *Meade*, I, 340.

<sup>75</sup> *Senate Reports*, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., no. 71; *New York Tribune*, December 14; *Frank Leslie's Newspaper*, January 10, 1863; *Harper's Weekly*, January 10. An after-effect of the Committee's visit was to lessen the confidence of the beaten army in Burnside and to inspire camp-fire debate as to his competence. Cochrane, *War for the Union*, pp. 47-48; "Excerpts from the Journal of Henry Raymond," *Scribner's Monthly*, XIX (1879-80).

<sup>76</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1863, I, 687-746.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 56-57; Franklin to McClellan, April 6, 1863, W. S. Myers, *General George Brinton McClellan* (New York, 1934), p. 408; Franklin, *A Reply of Major-General William B. Franklin to . . . the Committee on the Conduct of the War* (New York, 1863).

<sup>78</sup> Wade, *Facts for the People*, p. 4.

<sup>79</sup> Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions*, p. 204; *Detroit Advertiser and Tribune* (Chandler's organ), April 24, 1863.

<sup>80</sup> Meade to Mrs. Meade, May 20, 1863, Meade, *Meade*, I, 379; Chandler to Mrs. Chandler, May 29, Chandler MSS.; *New York Independent*, May 28, Washington correspondence.

<sup>81</sup> Hooker's testimony, *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, 111-18, 142; see also *ibid.*, 14-15, 15-16, 83.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, I, iv.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 311, 321, 325.

<sup>84</sup> *New York Independent*, October 22, 29, 1863, Washington correspondence; *Wilkes' Spirit of the Times*, August 29.

Committee worked to restore Hooker, waiting for Meade to commit a blunder.<sup>85</sup> The Radicals felt, however, that they could ignore Meade temporarily with the elevation of Ulysses S. Grant to the position of lieutenant general and supreme commander of the Union armies. Grant had previously encountered the hostility of the Committee and the Radicals because of his suspected Democratic opinions,<sup>86</sup> but he subsequently won their favor by indorsing emancipation and the use of Negro soldiers.<sup>87</sup> The Committee hoped, therefore, that he would purge the eastern army of its conservative officers, and Chandler presented him with a list of generals suspected of "McClellanism" with a recommendation for their removal.<sup>88</sup> However, when Grant permitted Meade to continue in command of the Army of the Potomac, the Committee decided to take action itself. It launched an investigation and summoned witnesses, the majority of whom were officers associated with the Radical faction. It learned that Meade and his corps commanders had no heart in prosecuting a war against slavery, that subordinates were responsible for the victory at Gettysburg, and that Meade, had he wished, could have destroyed Lee's army after the battle.<sup>89</sup> Armed with this testimony, Wade and Chandler called on Lincoln to "demand the removal of General Meade, and the appointment of someone more competent to command." They suggested Hooker and threatened to make their testimony public unless the President acceded.<sup>90</sup> Lincoln felt strong enough to refuse the Committee, but the latter bided its time for another lunge at Meade. Grant had given the members no aid in the attempt to oust Meade and their suspicions turned against him. Wade thought his Wilderness campaign a terrible blunder and urged Lincoln to dismiss him.<sup>91</sup>

The Committee made another unsuccessful attempt to secure Meade's downfall when it investigated the causes of the slaughter of Union troops in the Petersburg mine crater and ascribed the blame to Meade's refusal to render proper support to the attacking force.<sup>92</sup> Grant supported Meade strongly during the inquiry, and the Committee sought for an issue on which they could oppose the popular general. The members found it when Grant removed one of their favorite officers, Benjamin F. Butler, from command after his failure to capture Fort Fisher. Immediately the Radicals rallied to Butler's defense with a Senate

<sup>85</sup> New York *Independent*, December 10, Washington correspondence.

<sup>86</sup> General W. T. Sherman to his wife, October 4, 1863, M. A. DeWolfe Howe, ed., *Home Letters of General Sherman* (New York, 1909), pp. 278, 227-28; Colonel S. Noble to Trumbull, January 6, 1863, Trumbull MSS.; *C. C. W.*, 1863, III, 337-43.

<sup>87</sup> General David Hunter to Stanton, December 15, 1863, Stanton MSS.; General John Palmer to Trumbull, January, 1864, Trumbull MSS.; Pierce, *Summer*, IV, 172.

<sup>88</sup> *Life of Chandler*, p. 240.

<sup>89</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, i, iv, lvi-lvii, lxxv, 311, 375; Meade to Mrs. Meade, March 6, 9, 14, 1864, Meade, *Meade*, II, 169, 176-78; New York *Tribune*, March 7, 8, 1864.

<sup>90</sup> *Journal*, *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, xix.

<sup>91</sup> N. W. Stephenson, ed., *An Autobiography of Abraham Lincoln* (Indianapolis, 1926), pp. 416-17.

<sup>92</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1865, I, 1, 11-12; Julian, *Recollections*, 249; Meade to Mrs. Meade, December 20, 1864, Meade, *Meade*, II, 253-54; Grant to Meade, February 9, 1865, *ibid.*, p. 344.

resolution instructing the Committee to investigate the Fort Fisher expedition.<sup>93</sup> When Butler testified, the Committee permitted him to place a history of his whole war career on the record in addition to his account of the recent battle.<sup>94</sup> The Committee obviously intended to vindicate Butler completely,<sup>95</sup> but the war ended before it could complete the investigation although Wade issued a belated report upholding Butler in every respect and criticizing Grant severely.<sup>96</sup> With the Fort Fisher episode the Committee closed its investigations of army affairs, and the conclusion of peace witnessed the end of its labors. However, the Radical cabal had seen the value of such an agency in a struggle with a hostile executive, and when the Radical machine clashed with Andrew Johnson over the issues of reconstruction, the Congressional leaders prepared for the battle by creating the joint committee on reconstruction.

Space forbids any detailed consideration of all the other inquiries carried on by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. It also investigated many expeditions and battles of minor importance, the use of iron-clad ships, alleged Confederate atrocities, convalescent camps, trade with the enemy, paymasters and chaplains, types of heavy ordnance, contracts to furnish ice for the army, the treatment of Union prisoners in the South, and the prevalence of scurvy in the army. The importance of the Committee, however is in the thorny problem of the degree of control which the legislature, or any representative of the civilian branch of the government, should exercise over the military organization during wartime. In no other of our wars had Congress made such a determined attempt to control military operations or to dictate the personnel of the army. The experiment of the Committee was essentially a product of the times, and the people of the times expressed a contempt for technical education and a preference for amateurism in war. Again the Committee, with its political criteria for measuring the abilities of generals, was but reflecting the spirit of the period. The nation was engaged in a civil war which was the culmination of decades of controversy over the slavery question. Political parties and individuals differed fiercely on the disputed issue. The Civil War generals, many of whom had been in civilian occupations before the outbreak of the struggle, possessed pronounced and clashing opinions on the subject. Inevitably their views carried over after the war began. Then the slavery issue became a part of the conduct of the war. One political party demanded the abolition of slavery as a measure of military necessity; the other denounced this as a subterfuge to achieve a political objective. Because this question had military implications, the generals, whether they would or no, had

<sup>93</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1865, II, 1.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-49.

<sup>95</sup> Butler to Wade, February 7, 1865, *Butler Correspondence*, V, 540-42; General Godfrey Weitzel to Butler, January 30 (after Weitzel testified), *ibid.*, pp. 512-13.

<sup>96</sup> *C. C. W.*, 1865, II, i-viii. It will be noted that the Committee devoted most of its attention to the Army of the Potomac. This was because that army was often near Washington and its officers could come to the capital in a short time. The Committee members could repair to the camp of the army with the same ease.



to take sides. Thus they were dragged into the political maelstrom, and partisan rather than military standards determined their fortunes.

The experiment of the Committee reveals valuable knowledge as to the motives which actuate such an agency and the influence it exerts upon the army. The Committee, in addition to its insistence that generals of the right political faith command the army, tended to favor officers who recommended dashing charges and constant forward movements. The members had no patience with generals who spoke about the necessity of drill, careful preparation, siege, machinery, and precautionary measures. Hence every officer about to undertake a movement felt the pressure of achieving a rapid, smashing victory. Yet he knew that if he failed as a result of these tactics the Committee would demand his removal. Perhaps this accounts for the uncertain movements of many generals during the war. The Committee was usually able to grasp the broad concepts of strategy as related to the whole theater of the war, but the details of battlefield tactics remained a mystery to the members. Over and over in the committee rooms, the members quarreled with soldiers in discussing the latter subject. Reading the testimony at a later date, one is struck by the seeming inability of what might be called civilian and military minds to meet on common ground. The Committee, if divorced from its unfortunate political bias, might have performed a very real service. No other body in the country had its unique opportunity to gather information from all fields of the war. This information, presented in objective form to the army, would have been of great value. One student of the Civil War has suggested to the author that the Committee, had it so chosen, could have come closer to fulfilling the functions of a General Staff than any agency of the war period.

# THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF THE OFFICER IN THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

By Carl Vincent Confer

NOT the least of the consequences of the French Revolution was the appearance of universal compulsory military service among the nations of continental Europe. The *levée en masse* swept the invader out of France in '93. Peoples' armies built the First Empire—and peoples' armies destroyed it. Later in the century, Sadowa and Sedan were the triumphs of the Prussian drill-master as well as the Prussian teacher. These demonstrations relegated small professional armies into disfavor with all the Great Powers except those which, like Great Britain, relied chiefly upon other means of defense or were, like the United States, far enough removed from the European scene to depend upon a small army and a large militia.

Although she had been the originator of universal military service and had been the first to profit from its potentialities, France was, curiously enough, disinclined to adopt it in the nineteenth century. The device had of course acted as a boomerang during the War of Liberation. Of more weight certainly was the fact that the conservative regimes down to 1870 were afraid of a mass army with the revolutionary traditions which such an army in France was bound to have. Besides, for forty years after the Congress of Vienna no possible need for such a force arose. France was war-weary in 1815, and consequently the restored Bourbons could abandon universal military service although they dared not or desired not to abandon other revolutionary innovations like the land expropriation and administrative centralization. The professional army with its codes, prejudices, and attitudes prospered again, removed from the people and more than a little contemptuous of them. It was this situation which aroused Alfred de Vigny to write in 1835, with his own experiences as an officer as back-ground:

The Army is a nation within the Nation; this is one of the evils of our time . . . .  
. . . warfare has become civilized. But the Armies have not. For not only has the routine of our customs preserved all that was wrong in them, but the ambition or the fears of Governments have increased the ill by setting them daily farther apart from the country, and by making them into servitude more idle and uncouth than ever . . . . No doubt this cure is a difficult problem for the legislators to solve, but that makes it all the more necessary to have put it.

This I do here. And if our era is not destined to achieve its solution, at least it shall have been I who formulated the desire for it, and, therefore, perhaps lessened its difficulties.

The era in which the Armies shall be identified with the Nation cannot be hastened too much.<sup>1</sup>

Fifty-six years passed before Lyautey reformulated de Vigny's plea and sixty-five

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred de Vigny, *Military Servitude and Grandeur*, translated by F. W. Huard (New York, 1919), pp. 13 and 25. First published in 1835 at Brussels.

before a French Government moved to make it a reality. Only occasional voices kept the notion alive in the meantime.<sup>2</sup>

De Vigny's idea might have had to wait still longer if the Franco-Prussian War had not intervened to show the superiority of a large well-trained army over a courageous but ill-trained and ill-led one. When the new Republic was in a position to consider its defenses against future wars, it heeded the example of Prussia, abolished the old National Guard, and established universal military service upon the basis of a term of five years in the active army. The report of the commission on the recruiting and organization of the army, from which resulted the Military Law of 1872, explained that

the army will be the great school where everyone will learn the duties of the soldier before exercising the rights of the citizen . . . our domestic situation, as you know, has constantly inspired our work . . . our desire is to recreate devotion and patriotism in all hearts and minds,—in short, to reforge the ties that ought to unite all the sons of our troubled France.<sup>3</sup>

In reality the Law of 1872 did not result in genuine universal service. To begin with, the term of five years was too costly to be applied literally. Recognition of the impossible financial burden entailed by keeping every young man under arms for five years led to a division of the yearly contingent by lot into two parts: one part to serve for five years and the other for only one year. The Minister of War, moreover, was given the right to send the second group home after only six months. That practice soon became customary. Yet Thiers, who still distrusted militias, had wanted a term of seven years. When the National Assembly held out for a three year term such as the Prussians had employed since 1862, the compromise on five years had been arranged. But equally destructive of universality were the numerous groups granted dispensations: teachers, students of higher education, seminary students, and sole providers of families. The total came to something like 60,000 men a year.<sup>4</sup>

Not until 1889 was the term of service reduced from five to three years. The principle that all Frenchmen were subject to military service for *la Patrie* was reaffirmed, although once again numerous inequalities were allowed in actual practice. The Law of 1889 may be regarded as a signal triumph for the principle of the citizen's army. The advocates of a professional army were never in a position again to impose their views. Further changes, when they came, made for a more truly democratic army, not for a reversal of principle.

<sup>2</sup> For example, during the Second Empire, General Cluseret's *Armée et Démocratie* (Brussels, 1869), pp. 100-101, condemned the officer class as ". . . those men who hailed with the same enthusiasm the Empire, the Restoration, the Charter, the Republic, and then the Empire once more, and who would be disposed to go through this vicious circle again if it were not impossible, always under the pretext that in serving their own interests they were serving those of France." This work is besides an interesting forerunner of Jean Jaurès' project for a *nouvelle armée* based upon a militia.

<sup>3</sup> *Journal Officiel*, 6 April, 1872, p. 2396.

<sup>4</sup> Charles Seignobos, *L'Évolution de la 3<sup>e</sup> République* (Lavoisier Series, *Histoire de la France contemporaine*, vol. VII, Paris, 1921), p. 332.



Before this *fait accompli*, Frenchmen could be said, in brief, to have adopted one of four attitudes. There was what might be called the obstructionist point of view—the passive resistance of aristocratic officers who still controlled the army if not the Chamber and regarded the new men in the ranks as a necessary evil attendant upon modern tactical developments. At the opposite pole stood the Socialists. Frowning upon the army as the bulwark of reaction, they eventually came round, under Jaurès' tutelage, to advocating the democratic election of officers by the ranks and the replacement of the established French army with a complete militia system following the Swiss model. The other two viewpoints assumed less extreme grounds. One may be labelled the *patriotic-professional* attitude. It emphasized the need of preserving the existing state against foreign and domestic enemies as the primary national duty of all Frenchmen, irrespective of political beliefs. Since all practical means toward this end were to be employed fully, and since, willy-nilly, universal conscription was the military system of the time, all officers who held the national good at heart should contribute actively toward sharpening the instrument which had been entrusted to their expert hands. The remaining viewpoint may be called the *democratic-political*. Its adherents were the republicans who recognized in the old officer corps one of the hydra-heads of their ubiquitous antagonists. They were as nationalistic as the patriotic-professional group just mentioned, but they insisted upon not only the preservation of the State as such but also the defense and perpetuation of a democratic State. An article published in 1891 by Captain Hubert Lyautey, later French Resident General in Morocco and Marshal of France, was the charter of the patriotic-professional persuasion.<sup>5</sup> Its peculiar destiny was to be adopted and perverted by the democratic-political group after they came into control of the State in 1899.

Among the officers of the new army were a certain number, chiefly younger men, who enthusiastically advocated a realistic analysis of ways and means to make the most out of the new circumstances in which the army found itself. They summed up their ideas as "the social rôle of the officer"—"*le rôle social de l'officier*." They meant that the officer must accept the implications of the new people's army, that he must win the confidence and esteem of the men by personal interest in their welfare—to be brief, that he must gain their affection by feeding, teaching, and understanding them well, therein making of the army a grand social school in which the class antagonisms of France might be dissipated through three years training in cooperative enterprise.

Now the social rôle of the officer was not devised by these French officers of the nineties. They themselves did not advance such a claim. Good officers had been *practising* that rôle since armies began. When he gathered a company of friends, retainers, and old followers, the medieval captain usually knew or came to know each man thoroughly and intimately. He was acquainted with the

<sup>5</sup> Hubert Lyautey, "Du rôle social de l'officier," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. CXI, 15 March, 1891, pp. 443-59.

capacities of every individual and for his pains was likely to be sure of complete fidelity. In modern times, feats of devotion and firmness under fire performed by the ordinary soldier of the First Empire had become legendary. But those feats had been the products of war times, when plain necessity forged a moral bond between officer and men. Wars now broke out at greater intervals. By 1890 all of the contingent and most of the junior officers had never engaged in active warfare. The new situation clearly did not automatically insure the application of the social rôle of the officer. In fact, the trend was really in the other direction. The typical aristocratic officer disdained any further contact with his men after the day's drill had been completed. He found more agreeable company in the officers' mess or in the friendly salons of the garrison town. In this course he felt he had the tacit approbation of the old career officers who controlled the Ministry of War and the General Staff. Finally, even if he should be without class prejudice, the young officer, whether aristocratic or bourgeois in origin, frequently fell prey to the "staff goal"—the drawing up of the most intelligent officers into the highly specialized, technical staff work that settled them in bureaux far removed from personal contact with the rank and file. There a regiment was merely a pin on a map. To this pass, then, had come the social rôle of the officer in France—hampered out of the past by ancient social antipathies, threatened out of the future by the bureaucratization that was the unavoidable accompaniment of mass armies.

Other European nations had solved or were to solve the problem more effectively. Captain Lyautey contrasted the narrow technical training of French military schools with the broad moral education emphasized by the German schools.<sup>6</sup> The Italians were interested in the question,<sup>7</sup> and the Russians had experimented with the social rôle of the officer at an early date. W. A. Suchomlinov, later general and Minister of War, remarkably anticipated the early career of Lyautey when he wrote and published an article on the social rôle of the officer while he was a cornet in the Imperial Uhlan Guard Regiment at Warsaw from 1867 to 1871.<sup>8</sup> However, in some rather important respects the circumstances and consequences were dissimilar. Suchomlinov's article was published in a military gazette and so struck the fancy of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaievitch that a special troop was turned over to Cornet Suchomlinov for experimental purposes. Lyautey published his contribution anonymously in a literary journal, and after the authorship was revealed he found it advantageous to take a change of air in the colonies.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Lyautey, *loc. cit.*, p. 458.

<sup>7</sup> See Pier-Alberto Olivero, *La Missione militare e sociale dell' ufficiale* (Rome, 1895).

<sup>8</sup> In his *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1924), p. 17, Suchomlinov explained, "The primary purpose of my plan was to bring the officer into direct relationship with the men whom he would have to lead in battle."

<sup>9</sup> It is interesting to note that Suchomlinov became the friend and collaborator of General Ivonovitch Dragomirov, prominent Russian general and theoretician whose works were frequently translated into French—notably his *Manuel pour la préparation des troupes au combat* (Paris, 1885). Lyautey acknowledged his indebtedness to Dragomirov's ideas in his article of 1891, *loc. cit.*, p. 448.

Obviously, there was no inevitable correlation between the social rôle of the officer and democracy. Although they were intended to be the servants of a republic, the old-line officers of France spurned the *rôle social*, while in autocratic Germany and Russia it received a warmer welcome—undoubtedly because there the dual capacity of the officer as professional specialist and, at the same time, functional social overlord had not yet been shaken by national distress and political revolution. In the words of Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé, “universal short-term service is without danger in a country where military discipline is simply a continuation of social discipline.”<sup>10</sup>

On 15 March, 1891, the declaration of faith of the dissatisfied younger officers appeared in print in the form of Lyautey's anonymous contribution to the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. While in garrison at St. Germain, Lyautey had made a serious and fruitful effort to give the soldier something useful or wholesome to do with his spare time. The average officer there, when off duty, hurried away to private homes in Paris, leaving his men to make the most of uncomfortable barracks or, as was more usual, the questionable pleasures of the canteen and public wineshop. Lyautey took the trouble to provide the barracks with a lounging and game room supplied with writing paper and books, and he himself frequently mingled with the men there.<sup>11</sup> Although this experiment was not described in the article, it had been the impetus to Lyautey's thinking along the lines therein proposed.

In view of his intellectual searchings before 1891, it was not surprising that Lyautey should emphasize “social duty” in his essay. Precisely that conception underlay the work: “. . . even upon the ruins of vanished hierarchies, the social necessity for discipline, respect, and submission will not cease to exist”; but he gave it a new meaning when he added: “. . . the army will always be the best, if not the only school where these virtues will be learned.”<sup>12</sup> By way of introduction Lyautey paid homage to his friends, de Mun, de Vogüé, and Lavissee, whose notable rôles had been, “in place of the hateful and violent state of war which barrenly separates the children of the same soil, party from party, and class from class, to substitute the peaceful and fruitful study of the problems raised by the modern economic and industrial revolution.”<sup>13</sup> He proceeded, however, to ask if there was not a group naturally equipped to propagate more widely among French youths the necessity and urgency of social duty. His answer was the corps of 20,000 French officers through whose hands the whole younger generation of Frenchmen had to pass because of the three year obligatory military service. But

<sup>10</sup> E.-M. de Vogüé, *Regards historiques et littéraires* (Paris, 1892), p. 28. He was referring to Germany.

<sup>11</sup> Franchet d'Espèrey had described his visit to Lyautey's quarters about 1890 and the eagerly conducted inspection tour upon which he was taken: “Anxious to begin, he did not always wait for official sanction: he found himself threatened at that very moment by the Engineers for having of his own accord torn down some partitions and installed a dining room.” (*Discours de réception . . . à l'Académie française . . .* [Paris, 1935], p. 22.)

<sup>12</sup> Lyautey, *loc. cit.*, p. 457.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 444.



this corps was still hidebound by the tradition of an earlier period—the old officer was “simply a fighter of a rather rough type . . .”<sup>14</sup>—and the Government, too, had failed to comprehend that the officer was a convenient agent for social action.

Lyautey, accordingly, was bent upon awakening the State to an appreciation of this vital instrument. The duty of a model officer was to be “motivated by a personal love of humble people, filled with the new duties imposed upon social leaders, convinced of his educational rôle, and resolved to instill new life into the letter of his functions through the spirit of his mission.”<sup>15</sup> The weakness of the official military viewpoint lay in its belief that the recruit could be manoeuvred as objectively as a pawn on a chess board. “They carefully studied the instrument: the cannon, the rifle, the horse; and as little as possible the operator without whom the instrument is ineffective.”<sup>16</sup> The sooner the Government came to realize that the mind of the soldier was the decisive factor, the sooner the State would be safely grounded.

How was this genuine control of the troops to be attained practically? Above all, the officer should know thoroughly the men under his charge. He should be expected to look into the records of the recruit, both by inquiring at the place of enlistment and by writing to the officials of the particular locality, so that he will be informed of “their families, their antecedents, their aptitudes, and their ambitions.”<sup>17</sup>

The program had been outlined, but the men were admittedly wanting. The staff schools turned out map-readers instead of students of psychology. The situation called for reform, yet that reform had to work gradually from the bottom of the military scale upwards. Lyautey did not believe that much could be done by proselytizing the existing officers corps. The way to proceed was by winning over the newly trained officers through inculcating the new ideals in the military schools, where they were currently ignored. Only in this fashion could France expect to obtain a majority of officers with a genuine enthusiasm for their wider social obligations under the true meaning of national defense.

The article of 1891 was noteworthy in a number of ways. It was, for one thing, an honest statement of existing abuses and evils. Lyautey pointed out that objective observations on the part of many witnesses revealed that, from their term of military service, “a very large number of young men carry back to their homes a weakened moral sense, disdain for a simple, working life, and, from the physical standpoint, intemperate habits and a tainted blood which they transmit to others.”<sup>18</sup> He charged that among cavalry officers it was considered good form to know the horses better than the men,<sup>19</sup> and he was not afraid to refer to the “mandarin

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 445.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 446.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 451.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 447.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 450.

buttons" which were the goal of so many French officers.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, however, nothing radical in any political sense could be found in the article. The word "democracy" did not appear even once in the seventeen pages Lyautey wrote. Neither did he propose to formalize the *rôle social* in systematic lectures to be delivered by officers to the conscripts, as was done later. He did not suggest the imposition of a surveillance upon the officers in order to keep them in line. In brief, he believed in the efficacy of ordinary daily contacts. His own words were:

The method of application is extremely simple and obvious, and has already been applied and prescribed by the letter of the regulations. It is simply a matter of giving first place to that which has very often been relegated to second, and of increasing the efficacy of all the little means which arise from day to day for stimulating interest and faith in the work to be done—all without spending a minute more at the barracks than ordinarily and without ever tiring of the task.

This was written as an "epilogue" to his article some time after its publication.<sup>21</sup>

The vitality of Lyautey's essay was demonstrated by the continuation of the discussion it aroused. It was debated in the *Journal des Sciences militaires*, which published a hostile article in 1894 and two moderately favorable articles in 1895 and 1896.<sup>22</sup> In his *La Conscience nationale* (Paris, 1898), Henry Béranger devoted an essay to "L'Armée et la Nation," an ably written analysis of the problem and its solutions which referred to the article of 1891 without naming its author.

The anonymity of authorship did not long withstand the publicity that the article excited. Lyautey's name was disclosed unofficially with apparently disastrous consequences for his future military career. His friends, however, generally refrained from publicly linking his name to the article. This was particularly prudent during the last five years of the century when the bitterness stimulated by the Dreyfus Affair prevented both sides in that political and social struggle from approaching the problem of the *rôle social de l'officier* on its own merits.

The appearance of the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry in June, 1899, presaged the ultimate triumph of republicanism. The new Ministry and its successors (those of Combes, 1902-1905, and of Rouvier, 1905-1906) carried out an anti-clerical program culminating in the Associations Act of 1901 and the Separation Law of 1905. At the same time, they proceeded in a less dramatic fashion to republicanize the army. General André, who succeeded the conservative General Gallifet, was Minister of War from May, 1900, until November, 1904. One of his first reforms was to require all military promotions to be submitted for ministerial ap-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted by General Weygand in his preface to a recent edition (Paris, 1935) of Lyautey's article. The "epilogue" was made accessible to Weygand by the Mâréchale, who had survived her husband.

<sup>22</sup> These were later reprinted as, respectively: "un officier supérieur," *La Vérité sur le rôle social de l'officier* (Paris 1895); anonymous, *Encore un mot sur rôle social de l'officier* (Paris, 1895); and "E. B.," *A propos du rôle social de l'officier* (Paris, 1896). In the last of these the Dreyfus Affair plainly affected the attitude of a critic otherwise disposed to regard Lyautey's position favorably.

proval instead of to the General Staff. Numerous resignations from the Staff followed, but both political and military expediency set a limit to the removal of high officers. A republican army needed a steady supply of new officers at peace with the Republic and imbued with a zeal for making the most out of the plebeian material furnished by universal service.

In September, 1900, the *Congrès international de l'éducation sociale* met at Paris in connection with the *Exposition universelle* and included in its agenda "*la solidarité au régiment*." Among the resolutions of the Congress, in a long section headed "Enseignement dans l'armée," was the following: "The Congress calls the attention of the Minister of War and of the army chiefs to the necessity of developing in the officer corps a feeling for its social mission." As means toward the suggested end, the resolutions advised: "That lectures by professors acquainted with social problems be instituted in all military schools . . . that the officer should give lectures and provoke discussions in the barracks . . . that a real consumers' cooperative be formed in each company . . ." <sup>23</sup>

General André received these suggestions cordially and set in motion the reforms which were ultimately to realize all three. On the request of André, George Duruy, an instructor in the *École Polytechnique*, submitted to the Ministry in March, 1901, a plan for lectures on the *rôle social* to be introduced into the course in history and literature which Duruy taught there. The plan was approved by André on 22 April and went into effect immediately.<sup>24</sup> Similar lectures were added to the curricula at the military schools of Saint-Cyr, Saint-Maixent, Saumur, and Versailles.<sup>25</sup> In this way, the personnel of the "*armée éducatrice*" was assured for the future. In this way, too, the pendulum of opinion began to swing back and replace the difficulties that Lyautey encountered in the 1890's with the mark of official esteem in the succeeding years. The trend was emphasized by the appearance of a number of books on the *rôle social*, now that the Government itself smiled upon it.

Up to this point, nothing had been done beyond the program suggested by Lyautey. The Government determined, however, to sponsor the social influence of the army through instruments of its own creation. If the army could be popularized in France as a great *school* continuing the training begun in the lower grades, the Ministry of War was prepared to institute organized lectures in the regiments. The *circulaire* of 13 August, 1904, established the formula for lecture programs which had been experimented with by the *circulaires* of 17 April, 1902,

<sup>23</sup> Congrès international de l'éducation sociale, *Rapports et Compte rendu* (Paris, 1901), pp. 461-62.

<sup>24</sup> Duruy published his two lectures as *L'Officier éducatuer* (Paris, 1904). The work was dedicated to General Lyautey and contained passages lauding the article of 1891 and naming its author (pp. 51-55).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100. Commandant Ch. Ebener, upon whom the responsibility fell at Saint-Cyr, published his lectures as *Conférences sur le rôle social de l'officier* (Paris, 1901). He too quoted extensively from the article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* but felt obliged to respect the anonymity of the author (pp. 6-7).



and 17 April, 1903. It prescribed that "regimental lectures are one of the essential means for the moral education of the soldier" and suggested four main types of "themes": military and patriotic, civic, economic, and moral. Private agencies were also permitted to assist in the regeneration of the French army. Reading and recreation rooms called *foyers du soldat* were established in most garrison towns. Finally, the army was drawn into the widespread cooperative movement in France. Berteaux, Minister of War in 1905, won applause in the Chamber when he spoke of the 100,000 cooperativists whom the army would create each year.<sup>28</sup> By 1907 there were "... several hundred true consumers' cooperatives functioning in the units, squadrons, companies, and batteries."<sup>27</sup>

Lyautey himself, as his article disclosed by inference, preferred to rely upon a spiritual renaissance of the French officer corps. He regarded the lecture program and the cooperative units with a sceptical eye.<sup>28</sup> After the War, in fact, a reaction set in and less attention was paid to the lecture program, while the army cooperatives were curtailed in scope.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, the *rôle social de l'officier* did not fall into neglect in France. The novelty of the idea had worn off, but it had become for all of that a universally accepted premise of French military training.<sup>30</sup> The association of Lyautey with its origin was generally admitted. Marshal Pétain, speaking at the funeral of Lyautey, attributed the firmness and loyalty of the French soldiers in the World War in part to the consequences of the article of 1891:

These new ideas won considerable attention in France and abroad, not only in informed civil circles but particularly upon that generation of officers after 1870 whose work was inspired and directed by them. They contained the seeds of solidarity and cohesion which characterized the armies of the Great War.<sup>31</sup>

A satisfactory adjustment had thus been made between a professionally élite officers corps and the mass army of universal conscription.

<sup>28</sup> *Journal Officiel. Débats parlem.* (Chambre), 4 March, 1905, p. 749.

<sup>27</sup> Paul and Victor Margueritte, article in the *Dépêche de Toulouse*, 16 January, 1907.

<sup>28</sup> In his "epilogue" quoted above and cited in f. n. 21.

<sup>29</sup> See C. Brunetière, *L'Officier de demain* (Saint-Brieuc, 1920) and the *circulaire* of the Ministry of War dated 27 October, 1925.

<sup>30</sup> Officially approved guides for young officers still emphasize the *rôle social* and Lyautey's relationship to it, e. g., Captain Poumeyrol, *Essai sur l'éducation morale du soldat. Conseils pratiques à un jeune officier* (Paris, 1936), pp. 13-15.

<sup>31</sup> Marshal Pétain, *Discours*, *Le Temps*, 3 August, 1934.

# THE HUDDY & DUVAL PRINTS

*An Adventure in Military Lithography*

*By Frederick P. Todd*

THE years which ushered in the 1840's were fertile in signs of expanding nationalism. No two growths were lustier than our magazines and our volunteer militia, when, just a century ago, elements of each were combined to produce a periodical whose unique artistry remains unequalled in America to this day.

The country was literally flooded with periodicals; the number had increased from about one hundred in 1825 to approximately six hundred in 1850.<sup>1</sup> There were literary magazines by the score, sentimental ones by the hundreds, and magazines on religion and reforms far too numerous to count. They ranged from faddish mushroom growths with breath-taking titles (*Gems from the Sacred Mine, or Holy Thoughts upon Sacred Subjects* and *The Golden Chalice, or Mental Draughts from Many Fountains*) to the more solid fare of *Graham's Magazine*, the *Knickerbocker*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*.<sup>2</sup>

In like manner the land was teeming with companies of uniformed volunteers. There was one or more in every town while the larger cities counted hundreds, often with sufficient tradition and stability to permit grouping into regiments. If their training was sketchy — it rarely extended beyond a score of drills and parades with a turkey shoot now and then — some of the companies contained wealthy men and not a few had strong political connections.

They reflected every facet of our national existence. There were entire companies of Frenchmen, of Germans, and of Irishmen to represent the changing tides of immigration, often clothed in foreign uniforms and responding only to commands in a foreign tongue. There were on the other hand the "Native American" units, established to counteract this ingress of outsiders. There were companies to typify every walk of life and every shade of political opinion. "Silk stocking" regiments marched with bruisers from the Bowery, "Free Men of Color" drilled in Louisiana, and out along the frontier grizzled pioneers formed battalions of "Riflemen" and "Avengers."

One fact about these volunteer companies is clear, they were by and large active organizations. Whatever else may have prompted their members to join, all certainly were united in their dissatisfaction with the rapidly decaying militia system. Few now appreciate the importance of the "organized militia" of that day, a fantastic, unsystematic body of conflicting allegiance, half social club and half state police—a truly American phenomenon and the direct forebear of our modern National Guard.

<sup>1</sup> Frank L. Mott, *A History of American Magazines, 1741-1850* (New York, 1930), pp. 340-43.

<sup>2</sup> Winifred Gregory, ed., *Union List of Serials* (New York, 1927), *passim*.

The commercial possibilities of a magazine devoted to these amateur soldiers must have been obvious to many publishers. There was only one periodical in 1839, however, which catered to the military world, the *Army and Navy Chronicle*. A sort of forerunner of the modern service journal, it struggled along between 1835 and 1842. It was serious and more or less official in its leanings, and, since the volunteer was not very strong on the literary side, it could have had but little popular appeal.

What was needed was a light magazine, reasonably patriotic, but, above all, illustrated. Illustrations, of course, cost money, particularly the engravings which were then the principal type in use by publishers. The lithographic process of reproduction was comparatively new, but American artists were growing more and more familiar with its possibilities. The dream of illustrated magazines suddenly became a practical reality.

There were, in Philadelphia, two men who saw these opportunities and who, in 1839, were able to profit by them. Colonel William H. Huddy and Peter S. Duval produced in March of that year the *Military Magazine*. There was no doubt at whom these men were directing their literary and graphic arrows. The full title of the journal made clear that it was offered to "the Volunteers of the United States of America, together with the Army and Navy," the last part coming almost as an afterthought.<sup>3</sup>

One of these men, at least, was ideally equipped for the work. Duval had been a prominent lithographer in Philadelphia for some years and was justly famous for his skill as a colorist. He had come to this country from France in 1831 to manage a new lithographic department which had been opened in the engraving firm of Cephas G. Childs, and later he took over Child's business. In many respects Duval was a pioneer in the industry and most certainly his skill contributed not a little to the success of the venture.<sup>4</sup>

About the second man, William H. Huddy, far less is known. He lived in Philadelphia and appears to have belonged to a militia regiment in that city, for some military title is usually attached to his name. He must have possessed artistic ability since a number of the lithographs which appeared in the magazine are based on his original drawings. There is also reason to believe that he was by trade a jeweler. Perhaps his principal contribution to the partnership was either the required military touch or the salesmanship which kept the venture above water, but officially he was the editor and seems to have done what little writing was required.

<sup>3</sup> As was often the case with magazines at that time, the title varied. The first issue appeared under the name *The Military Magazine: and Record of the Volunteers of the City and County of Philadelphia*. This was obviously too local an appeal and in the second issue was altered to *Military Magazine, and Record of the Volunteers of the United States of America, together with the Army and Navy*. It was often referred to by the publishers themselves as the *U. S. Military Magazine*, and by this name it is known to most collectors.

<sup>4</sup> Harry T. Peters, *America on Stone* (Garden City, N. Y., 1931), pp. 163-68, 225-26; Frank Weitenkamp, "American Military Prints," *Print Connoisseur*, I, 254-77.



As stated above, the *Military Magazine* made its debut in March 1839, and the firm of Huddy & Duval was organized shortly after the appearance of its first issue. The original plan called for two volumes, the first featuring the glorious appearance of the volunteers, the second dealing with the older and more solid exploits of the Army and Navy. This apparent disproportion was later aggravated by the addition of a third volume devoted to the militia. The magazine was issued in monthly installments and was produced for a period of over three years, a long run considering its probable overhead. The average life of an American periodical of those days was not much over six months.<sup>6</sup> Each number appeared in covers of dull blue cartridge paper and usually contained either two or three hand-colored lithographic prints and a limited amount of text.

The title of the *Military Magazine* implies that it contains considerable textual material. Actually, a glance suffices to show that its importance lies not in its text but in its illustrations. It was essentially a collection of prints issued periodically with a smattering of military anecdotes, biographies, and historical notes on past wars, and a salting of appropriate, although somewhat remarkable, poetry. Explanatory material accompanied each print, usually a brief history of the engagement or organization depicted. The text is occasionally instructive, but it is interesting chiefly as it represents the top-heavy sentimentality of the period.

The prints in this series, all of which were executed on the Duval press in Philadelphia,<sup>6</sup> are, however, in a class by themselves. Nothing else of the sort has ever been produced in this country to approach them in their extraordinary combination of beauty and accuracy. Even in France or in Russia we must search long to find their equal. To students of military antiquities they are a source of invaluable data, and to the collector of prints they are a splendid example of the best in American lithography. Carl W. Drepperd has said of them that "they are exquisite things, and worthy of a place on the walls of the most discriminating collector or the most exacting connoisseur."<sup>7</sup> Harry T. Peters, one of America's foremost collectors and authorities on this subject, considers them as possessing "astonishingly decorative and dramatic values," and, in fact, this opinion appears to be shared by all who have studied them.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the prints are 8 x 10½ inches in size, not including margins which vary up to an inch or more. In common with the better lithographs of the period, they have all been colored by hand.

It is from the point of view of subject interest that the prints in the *Military Magazine* are, perhaps, of greatest value. The major part of them illustrate the

<sup>6</sup> Mott, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

<sup>7</sup> Carl W. Drepperd, *Early American Prints* (New York, 1930), pp. 179-83; Peters, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-26.

<sup>8</sup> Drepperd, *op. cit.*, p. 179. Mr. Drepperd becomes even more enthusiastic further along calling the prints "so excellent that one need never be ashamed of them, even if hung side by side with the best aquatints in color that England ever sent over to brighten the walls of the 'crude' Americans."

<sup>9</sup> Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 226.



uniforms worn by volunteer militia units of the day; the remainder show various naval subjects, soldiers of note, and battles. Although the execution of battle scenes — a weak point with most artists of the period — leaves much to be desired, the groups representing militia units now almost forgotten are singularly accurate. These plates are the only existing records of the dress of most of these organizations. In every case in which it has been possible to check with other material they have been found to be almost flawless in detail. Obviously the lithographs were executed from carefully drawn and equally carefully colored sketches of living models, since the artists could hardly have had photographs from which to work, at least at first.

There, in all their gay trappings, stand the old corps of Fencibles, Rifles, Guards, and Hussars. With them are the Greys, Blues, and Greens which formed so large a part of the volunteers of the period. Their preposterously high shakos, their gilt and tinsel trimmings, their bright colored if shoddy tunics seem only absurd to us today. But we should not forget that this gleam and polish was an inseparable part of the era, to be found in every army, even among our own Regulars on the frontier.

It might also be mentioned that much of the magnificence one sees in these prints was rented, for it was essential to make a great show on parade. Muskets and accoutrements were borrowed from state arsenals, horses were provided by wealthier citizens, and even beards were rented for certain occasions. Some companies habitually marched preceded by their plated-ware strung on poles, flanked by mascots and friends, and followed by Negro servants equipped with buckets of champagne and ice. When there is added to this picture the mud and pigs which went with most of the streets and the strong drink which was a part of such an event, we can gain some idea of a parade in the forties. Yet these men on the whole marched with the same readiness to a riot as they did to a clam-bake. Most of the companies bore scars of some civil disturbance.

The drawings and lithographs themselves were executed by a number of different artists, several of whom were, or shortly became, very well known. On the whole they were able craftsmen. Prominent among them was Alfred Hoffs, portrait painter and crayon draughtsman as well as lithographer. He later exhibited at the Pennsylvania Academy over a period of several years. Some of the finest lithographs were made by Albert Newsam, a deaf mute; others were the work of August Koellner and of John Rubens Smith.\*

The scheme used to develop the sale of the *Military Magazine* is not unknown to present day photographers. It rested largely on the promise of fame, for advertisements in each issue ran:

Any company sending a correct sketch of their corps, endorsed by the commanding officer, can be inserted in the magazine by taking fifty colored plates at the established price, or one hundred plain. The same privilege is extended to Officers of the Army and Navy, where likenesses are taken. Colored plates, 50 cents; plain, 25 cents.

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\* Peters, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-22, 296-300, 254-55.



The privilege of spending \$25.00, then, got a colored print of one's unit in the magazine and enough copies beside to distribute among one's friends. Naturally the most accessible field lay with the volunteers and great effort was made to cover it. Agents were located in Cleveland, Columbus, Troy, Albany, New York, Sparta, Savannah, Baltimore, Portsmouth, St. Louis, New Orleans, Camden, Providence, and Detroit. The rates varied, but usually a year's subscription cost \$10.00 if colored plates were desired, \$5.00 if plain. Single issues of the magazine were \$1.00 for the colored and 50 cents for the uncolored.

The last issue of the *Military Magazine*, appearing in June, 1842, contained no forewarning of the end. Certainly material could not have been lacking since only a small portion of the volunteer units had been portrayed. In fact, several of the most prominent and wealthy regiments of the period are not included in the series. Doubtless the great expense of the plates furnished the real reason. Other publishers were experiencing similar worries, some complaining that a single illustration cost more than all of the literary contents of an issue.<sup>10</sup>

Though scattered prints from this series exist in numerous public and private collections, complete sets are very rare. Two sets which appear to be complete, one of them fully colored, are to be found in the library of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Another set is in the possession of the Library Company of Philadelphia, and a fourth is in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Since the series is not completely or accurately indexed, since some of the titles of the prints are known to vary, and since most of the plates are unnumbered and none of them bound in the folders, an accurate collation is hardly possible at this date. The tentative checklist which follows is based on an examination of the sets at West Point and of several incomplete sets. No attempt has been made to give more than the main titles.

## VOLUME 1

FRONTISPIECE [A symbolic military design] / "In time of PEACE, prepare for WAR" / Washington. *J. R. Smith (after Huddy). A. Hoffs.*

[Title page to Volume 1]

March 1839

No. 1. FIRST TROOP PHILADA. CITY CAVALRY. *J. R. Smith (after Huddy). A. Hoffs.*

No. 2. STATE FENCIBLES. 1st COMPY [Philadelphia]. *J. R. Smith (after Huddy). A. Hoffs.*

No. 3. Facsimile / of the / REVOLUTIONARY FLAG, A. D. 1774 [Standard of the First Troop, Philadelphia City Cavalry]. *A. Hoffs. A. Hoffs.*

April 1839

No. 4. Riding Dress. / TO THE FIRST PHILADA. CITY TROOP, this plate is most Respectfully dedicated by / their Obt Svt / Wm. M. Huddy. *J. R. Smith (after Huddy). A. Hoffs.*

No. 5. LIGHT ARTILLERY. / TO THE WASHINGTON GREYS [Philadelphia]. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Wm. M. Huddy. *A. Hoffs. A. Hoffs.*

No. 6. TO THE GERMAN WASHINGTON RIFLE CORPS [Philadelphia] / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Wm. M. Huddy. *A. Hoffs. A. Hoffs.*

<sup>10</sup> Mott, *op. cit.*, pp. 519-24.



TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR

1757

*May 1839*

- No. 7. TO THE NATIONAL GREYS [Philadelphia], / this plate is most Respectfully dedicated / by Wm. M. Huddy. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 8. TO THE TOMPKINS BLUES OF NEW YORK, / this plate is most Respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 9. TO THE MONTGOMERY HIBERNIA GREENS [Philadelphia] / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*

*June 1839*

- No. 10. TO THE WASHINGTON GREYS OF READING. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 11. TO THE PHILADELPHIA GREYS / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 12. TO THE LIGHT GUARD, OF NEW-YORK / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*

*July 1839*

- No. 13. TO THE ALBANY BURGESSES CORPS / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 14. TO THE UNION FENCIBLES OF PHILADa. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 15. VIEW OF CAMP WASHINGTON, AT TRENTON. / From the Old Quaker Road. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. Hoffy and O'Connor [?].*

*August 1839*

- No. 15. TO THE WASHINGTON LIGHT INFANTRY of Washington City, / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / By Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 — — [Engravings on double sheet showing facsimiles of material relating to the capture of Major Andre. One of the engravings is a sketch of the scene by James Queen. Uncolored.]

*September 1839*

- — TO THE TROY CITIZENS CORPS [Troy, N. Y.], / this plate is most Respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. B. Moore. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 18. TO THE MONTGOMERY LIGHT GUARDS OF N. YORK, / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.* [Numbered 16 in some series.]

*October 1839*

- — W. H. Harrison [Facsimile signature; uncolored lithograph]. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 19. GENL. Wm. H. HARRISON & STAFF, / AT THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES, *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 20. TO THE CLEVELAND GRAYS OF CLEVELAND (OHIO) / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*

*November 1839*

- — [Yale College & State House, New Haven, Connecticut; steel engraving.]  
 No. 21. TO THE / NEW ENGLAND GUARDS [Boston], / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *W. J. Hubbard. A. Newsam.*  
 No. 22. TO THE BOSTON LIGHT INFANTRY, / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. Hoffy.*

*December 1839*

- — Washington [Steel engraving].  
 — — The Death of Montgomery [Steel engraving after Trumbull].  
 No. 23. TO THE PULAWSKI CADETS OF N. YORK. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. Hoffy.*  
 No. 24. TO THE ANCIENT & HONORABLE ARTILLERY / OF BOSTON. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. Hoffy.*

*January 1840*

- No. 25. GENL. BENJAMIN LINCOLN. / U. S. ARMY. *J. R. Smith. A. Hoffy.*



- No. 26. TO THE JACKSON ARTILLERISTS, OF PHILADA. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*  
 No. 27. TO THE HIBERNIA GREENS OF PHILADA. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

[Variant form:]

- No. 27. TO COL. W. H. ELSEGOOD, OF THE 19th REGT. CAPT. / OF THE HIBERNIA GREENS OF PHILADA. / this plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

February 1840

- — [Facsimiles of signatures on the Declaration of Independence; steel engraving.]  
 No. 28. TO THE WASHINGTON BLUES OF PHILADA. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*  
 — — TO THE WASHINGTON CAVALRY OF PHILA. COty. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

## VOLUME 2

[Title page to Volume 2 containing a symbolic military engraving by A. Koellner.]

July 1840

- — THE ARMY & NAVY. / Genl. Washington presenting Capt. Barry with his Commission. 22nd Febr. 1797. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*  
 No. 2. [Facsimile of the commission issued to Captain Barry; steel engraving.]  
 No. 3. FRIGATE CONSTITUTION, / Bearing the Pendant of Commodore JESSE DUNCAN ELLIOTT. / Malta, February 1838. *J. Evans. A. Newsam.*  
 No. 4. PASSED MIDSHIPMAN. U. S. NAVY. / Full Dress. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

August 1840

- No. 6. THE [British] FLAG found after the MASSACRE at WYOMING. *Richard Smith. J. Queen.*  
 — — U. S. FRIGATE CONSTITUTION. / Malta, Febr. 22nd 1838. *J. Evans. A. Newsam.*

[Steel engraving, included with text, of the flag of the 25th U. S. Infantry after the Battle of Bridgewater.]

- — LIEUTENANT, U. S. NAVY. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

September 1840

- — THE BATTLE OF BUNKER'S HILL. [Uncolored lithograph after Trumbull.] *A. Huffy.*  
 — — BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE, / taken 15 Minutes after the commencement of the action. *J. Evans. T. S. Wagner.*

October 1840

- — BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE. / Perry Victorious closing Scene of the action. *J. Evans. J. Queen.*  
 — — Lieutenant . . . Staff Officer. / U. S. MARINE CORPS. *A. Huffy. A. Huffy.*

November 1840

- — THE U. S. FRIGATE PHILADELPHIA ON THE ROCKS OFF TRIPOLI. / Oct. 31st 1801. *E. J. Pinkerton.*  
 — — Diagram of the Action between the U. S. Frigate Constitution Com. Bainbridge and H. M. Frigate Java Capt. Lambert. *J. Queen.* [Uncolored lithograph.]  
 — — PRIVATE . . . NAVAL MONUMENT. / U. S. MARINE CORPS *A. Huffy.*

December 1840

- — COMMODORE CHARLES STEWART / TO THE OFFICERS SAILORS AND MARINE'S OF THE UNITED STATES. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Huffy.* [Last line sometimes cut off.]  
 — — CAPTURE OF H. M. SHIPS CAYNE & LEVANT BY THE U. S. FRIGATE CONSTITUTION. / TO CHAS. STEWART ESQ. HIS OFFICERS & CREW. / This plate is respectfully dedicated by / Huddy & Duval. *Birch. Jas. Queen.*

January 1841

- — BATTLE OF NEW-ORLEANS. / January 8th 1815. *Hibb. Ladotte. J. Huffy.* [uncolored lithograph.]

- — On Post . . . Full Dress . . . Fatigue Dress. / UNITED STATES CADETS. / WEST POINT. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. Koellner.*

February 1841

- — MILITARY EXECUTION. / Frederick recognizes that it is his Brother Charles, whom he is drafted out to shoot for desertion. / To F. H. Duffee, Author of "The Deserters," this plate is Respectfully dedicated by / Huddy & Duval. *J. Queen.*

- — Military Execution [uncolored lithograph of a French military execution].

- — U. S. DRAGOON CORPS. / FULL DRESS. *A. Koellner.*

March 1841

- — Major Genl. Edmund P. Gaines [facsimile signature] / TO THE OFFICERS & SOLDIERS OF THE U. S. ARMY. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Koellner.*

- — REPULSION OF THE BRITISH AT FORT ERIE. / On the 15th of August 1814, at 2 O'Clock A. M. *E. C. W. J. Queen.*

April 1841

- — BATTLE OF PLATTSBURG BAY. / McDONOUGH'S VICTORY. / Sept. 11th 1814. *J. Queen.*

- — (CAPTAIN.) / UNITED STATES INFANTRY. / FULL DRESS. *A. Koellner.*

May 1841

- — Major Genl. Winfield Scott [facsimile signature]. / TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE U. S. ARMY. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Koellner.*

- — PRISON SHIP "SARATOGA," / off Dartmouth. *M. Aikin. P. S. Duval* [?].

- — UNITED STATES ARTILLERY. / (CAPTAIN.) *A. Koellner.*

June 1841

- — A. Macomb [facsimile signature] / MAJOR GENL. A. MACOMB. / LATE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE U. S. ARMY. *Chs. Fenderich.*

- — Hon. John Bell [facsimile signature] / Hon. John Bell / Secretary of War. *Chs. Fenderich.*

### VOLUME 3

[Title page to Volume 3]

July 1841

- — CAMP WAYNE. / Pennsylvania Volunteer Encampment on the Paoli Battle Ground Sept. 19th-20th-21st-22nd 1840. / U. S. Military Magazine. *J. Queen.*

- — YORK PENNA RIFLE CORPS. / Vol. 3. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*

- — TO THE 1st COMPANY OF / MONTGOMERY GUARDS 51st REGt. N. Y. STATE INFANTRY. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Hoffy. A. Hoffy.*

August 1841

- — CAPT. JAMES POLK DICKINSON. / DE KALB RIFLE GUARDS. / CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA. / This Plate is most respectfully dedicated by / . . . Huddy & Duval, Publishers. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*

- — CAPT. HOLMAN. / CHESTER COUNTY TROOP, / PENNA. *A. Koellner.*

September 1841

- — TO CAPT. H. S. MOORHEAD & CORPS. / OF THE "LEHIGH ARTILLERISTS" OF ALLENTOWN, Pa. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated by / . . . Huddy & Duval, Publishers. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*

- — 1st COMPANY NATIVE AMERICAN BATTALION OF N. O. *A. Hoffy.*

October 1841

- — TO THE RICHMOND LIGHT INFANTRY BLUES. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *J. B. Danforth. A. Koellner.*

- — TO THE NATIONAL GUARD [of Philadelphia]. / This Plate is Respectfully Dedicated by / Huddy & Duval. *A. Newsam. A. Newsam.*

## November 1841

- — David R. Porter [facsimile signature] / GENL. DAVID R. PORTER, / GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA. *W. M. Huddy and A. Koellner. A. Koellner and A. Newsam.*
- — TO CAPT E. W. ROBERTS / DAUPHIN GUARDS HARRISBURG, Pa. / This Plate is most respectfully dedicated by / Huddy & Duval. *Wm. M. Huddy. A. [?].*
- — CAMP LAFAYETTE AT YORK Pa. / AUGUST 1841. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*

## December 1841

- — To Capt. GEORGE WASHINGTON BEHN of the / GEORGIA HUSSARS / SAVANNAH, GEO. *A. Newsam. A. Koellner.*
- — Reading Artillerists, 1 of Reading, Pa. *A. Newsam. A. Newsam.*

## January 1842

- — TO / MAJOR WILLIAM FRY, / BRIGADE INSPECTOR. / Allentown, Lehigh County, Pa. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*
- — TO THE HARRISON GUARDS OF ALLENTOWN, Pa. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Newsam. A. Koellner.*

## February 1842

- — To the / FIRST TROOP MONTGOMERY COUNTY. / CAPT Wm Z. MATHEYS. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Newsam and A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*
- — TO THE WASHINGTON GREYS OF READING Pa. / This Plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Newsam. A. Newsam.*
- — TO THE MACON VOLUNTEERS OF MACON, GEO. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Edwin V. Sharp. Severin Cichowski.*

## March 1842

- — TO MAJOR Fredk. Hambright [facsimile signature] Lancaster, Pa. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Koellner. Koellner.*
- — TO THE JACKSON RIFLE CORPS, LANCASTER, Pa. / CAPT. F. HAMBRIGHT. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *Wm M. Huddy. A. Koellner.*

## April 1842

- — CAMP MONTGOMERY. / at POTTSTOWN, Octob. 7th 1841. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*
- — To Lieut. Col. Wm. J. B. Andrews [facsimile signature]—Aid to his / Excellency David R. Porter. / This Plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Newsam. A. Koellner.*

## May 1842

- — CAMP KOSCIUSKO. / READING, Pa. May 19th 1842. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*
- — TO THE 1st COMPANY / GERMAN WASHINGTON GUARDS, PHILADELPHIA. / This Plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *[?] C. Cichowski.*
- — TO CAPT. ALDEN PARTRIDGE. / OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTE, / NORWICH VERMONT. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*

## June 1842

- — CAMP BALTIMORE. / MARYLAND. / Commenced on the 16th May & Ending on the 23th 1842. *Js Queen. Js Queen.*
- — To the / FIRST BALTIMORE INVINCIBLES. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*
- — AT THE FIRST STATE TROOP, PHILADA Co. CAVALRY. / This plate is most respectfully dedicated / by Huddy & Duval. *A. Koellner. A. Koellner.*



# PROFESSIONAL NEWS

An informal meeting of those members of the INSTITUTE who are resident at or near Washington — the first of its kind — was held on June 21 at the Army and Navy Club. The subject for discussion was "*The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* — its history and contents, its limitations, and its utility to students." An article by Dr. Dallas D. Irvine, "The Genesis of the *Official Records*" (*Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV, 221-29), served as a point of departure.

Mr. Branch Spalding and Major Joseph Mills Hanson, both of the National Park Service, told of their use of the compilation in connection with battlefield restoration. Dr. W. L. G. Joerg, Chief of the Division of Maps and Charts of The National Archives, presented valuable information concerning the sources and methods of preparation of the maps in the *Atlas* accompanying the series. Others who spoke were Colonel John R. M. Taylor, Colonel Bryan Conrad, and Brigadier General G. W. McIver.

Mr. F. Stansbury Haydon, Johns Hopkins University, discussed the limitations of the *Official Records*, giving examples of material not included which he had discovered in the course of his work on aeronautics in the Civil War. In his opinion, scarcely ten per cent of the relevant documents had been published. Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding, under whose supervision much of the work on the official operations records of the World War has been conducted, replied to Mr. Haydon by reminding the meeting that the basic intention of the series was to present documents relating solely to operations and that the *Official Records* remains by far the largest collection of such data ever published on any war.

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In the future the headquarters of the INSTITUTE, newly established at 3112 Que Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., can be used for all smaller meetings as well as for general research and study. Although not large, these quarters will be sufficient to house a competent reference library, the files of indexes, notes, and clippings which are being assembled, and the records of the society.

All members are invited to make use of its facilities when in Washington. As far as possible, the Secretary should be notified in advance, by mail or telephone (Dupont 8964), of the desire to call at the headquarters, but it is hoped to have an attendant present during the major part of every day.

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As announced in the last issue of the JOURNAL, a joint session of the INSTITUTE and the American Historical Association will be held at the annual meeting of the two organizations in Washington in December. Three papers will be presented in a program centering on the subject of land power and sea power in modern history. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Professor A. Whitney Griswold of the Department of Government and International Relations at Yale University, author of *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*; and Dr. Alfred Vagts, author of *A History of Militarism*, have consented to read papers. General discussion of these papers will be led by Captain W. D. Puleston, author of the biography of Mahan reviewed in this issue of the JOURNAL; by Dr. Edward Mead Earle of the Institute for Advanced Study; and by Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah. Brigadier General Oliver L. Spaulding is to be chairman. The meeting is to be the main session Thursday morning, December 28, and it is hoped that members of the INSTITUTE will attend in strength. An announcement of the program will be mailed to members prior to the meeting.

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With this issue Mr. Jesse S. Douglas joins the staff of the JOURNAL as Managing Editor. Mr. Douglas is employed in the Division of War Department Archives, The National Archives, and has been working for some time on the military history of the Pacific Northwest.

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Other work in progress is listed below. The JOURNAL will be glad to publish notices of projects called to its attention as a means of informing persons interested in this field of the plans of co-workers.

Dr. Henry P. Beers, The National Archives, author of *The Western Military Frontier, 1815-1846*, is now working on the Army in the South from 1815 to 1830.

Mr. Detmar H. Finke, in care of the Secretary, is engaged in research in this country and in Mexico on the uniforms of the Mexican Army.

Major James R. Jacobs, Manlius, New York, author of *Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson*, is at work on a history of the United States Army from 1783 to 1815.

Mrs. Grace Lewis Miller, Palm Springs, California, is preparing a biography of Captain Meriwether Lewis.

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The Government of Venezuela has announced a contest on the subject of Bolivarian Military History. Five prizes, consisting of medals and diplomas, will be awarded to the best military studies of Simon Bolivar comprising five hundred or more pages submitted before September 9, 1940, and the manuscript awarded the first prize will be published. Further details about the rules of the contest can be obtained from the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington.

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Since July, 1938, the National Park Service has taken over the administration of several areas closely associated with the military history of this country. One of these is the Fort Laramie National Monument on the site of the famous fur trading post and frontier fort in Wyoming; plans have been drawn for the restoration of the bachelor officers' quarters and the sutler's store. Another is the Ackia Battleground, Mississippi, scene of an engagement between the English and the Chickasaws on the one side and the French and the Choctaws on the other. The Big Hole Battlefield, the site of the battle between Nez Perce Indians and United States troops near the Bitter Root Valley, Montana, August 9-10, 1877, has recently been enlarged.

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Last spring, after an interval of two years, the facilities of the New York Historical Society were once again placed at the service of the public. To the original building, on Central Park West, New York City, two new wings have been added; the central portion has been completely altered; and both the library and museum have been reinstalled.

The contributions made by this Society to the study of American military history are well known. Its rich manuscript collections are indispensable in the study of Colonial and Revolutionary operations and establishments, while its library of over two hundred thousand volumes contains a wealth of unique and interesting items. Of importance to students of arms and antiquities is the military section of its museum.

Several exhibits deserve special mention. One is the group of military portraits included in the Society's valuable collection of American paintings. Another is an unusual display of objects, gleaned after years of patient excavation of Revolutionary camp sites, bearing upon the everyday life of the early soldiery. A third is the splendid collection of powder horns, dating from 1756 to 1849.

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Early in the seventeenth century the Sieur du Praissac, a rather shadowy figure, published *Les Discours Militaires*. In 1639 Roger Daniel of Cambridge, "printer to that famous Universitie," brought out a translation, *The Art of Warre*, by John



Cruso, fellow of Caius College and author or translator of several military books. It proved a popular work, so extensively used as to become very rare. It has been supposed that there was a second edition, rarer still. This was not to be found in any of the principal libraries and no copy appears to have come up in auction sales. Cockle (*Bibliography of English Military Books*) did not see it himself but noted its existence on the strength of Bowes' *Catalogue of Cambridge Books*, which, being consulted, proves to be no original authority either. Bowes does not include it of his own knowledge but in a supplementary list furnished by Mr. Jenkinson of the university library giving additional books believed to have been printed in Cambridge. But this 1642 edition was not in the university library so we might surmise that Mr. Jenkinson also relied on hearsay. Recently, however, the Library of Congress has acquired a copy bearing date of 1642. It is not a new edition but merely that of 1639 with the title page not too neatly cut out and a newly printed one substituted. The outbreak of the civil war had caused a tremendous demand for military manuals, and naturally the newest and most up to date would be the best sellers. If there was a little sharp practice about this business it was mild compared to that of certain publishers who, at the beginning of our Revolution, reprinted antique tactical books that had been obsolete for generations. We cannot tell how many copies of Cruso's pseudo-second edition were issued; certainly very few survive and it may be that the Library of Congress copy is unique.

T. M. S.

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Major Charles Winslow Elliott, whose articles on "The Men that Fought at Minden" appeared in the last issue, is probably best known for his *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* and for his many contributions to the *United States Infantry Journal*.

Dr. T. Harry Williams is Assistant Professor of History at Omaha University. His present article on "The Committee on the Conduct of the War" is closely related to his "Frémont and the Politicians," which was published in the *JOURNAL*, II, 179-91.

Dr. Carl Vincent Confer, author of "The Social Influence of the Officer in the Third French Republic," is an instructor at St. Petersburg Junior College, Florida. He wrote his dissertation on Lyautey and the Moroccan Problem and is especially interested in the colonial and military history of the Third French Republic.

Mr. Hugh C. McBarron, who both wrote and illustrated the introductory article on uniforms of the War of 1812 which appears in the Notes and Antiquities section of this issue, is a Chicago artist who combines the skill of his profession with a sense of historical research to produce sketches of unusually careful detail.

# THE MILITARY LIBRARY

*The Siege of Charleston; with an Account of the Province of South Carolina: Diaries and Letters of Hessian Officers from the von Jungkenn Papers in The William L. Clements Library*, translated and edited by Bernhard A. Uhlandorf. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1938. Pp. 445. \$4.00.)

To Baron von Jungkenn, Minister of State of Hesse-Cassel, officers of Hessian military units which served with the British in the American Revolution sent detailed reports of their activities. In 1932 the von Jungkenn papers were acquired by the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor; and from them Mr. Uhlandorf has selected for publication in this volume those which relate to the participation of the Hessians in the campaign which resulted in the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1780. They consist of diaries of Captains Johann Ewald and Johann Hinrichs, supplemented by a brief diary of Major General Johann Christoph von Huyn and a small number of letters. They are printed both in the original German and in English translation. Together they give to the reader a detailed account of the campaign: the embarkation at New York, the stormy voyage to the South, the debarkation on the South Carolina coast, the investment, siege, and capture of Charleston, and the return to New York. They are necessarily concerned, not with major problems of strategy, but largely with the day-by-day happenings in which the writers were participants or of which they were immediate observers. In addition, Hinrichs appended to his diary some interesting observations on the history, climate, and products of South Carolina and a description of Charleston. It should be of interest to the economic determinist to note this comment of a Hessian officer whose emotions were not greatly involved in the war:

The safe rule, according to which one can always ascertain whether a man is a loyalist or a rebel, is to find out whether he profits more in his private interests, his mode of life, his way of doing things, etc., when he is on our side or on that of the enemy. There are only very few exceptions to this rule: on the side of the enemy are a few enthusiasts and some pseudophilosophical-political dreamers . . . , while on our side there may be a small number of which one can say with conviction that love and faithfulness to God and their lawful King has brought them under the colors of their sovereign.

There is much of interest in these documents for a student of the details of military operations and particularly of the conduct of the siege. They do not, of

course, themselves contain sufficient information for the development of a well rounded understanding of the siege of Charleston, but they constitute a valuable addition to the readily accessible source materials available for a study of this important event in the history of the American Revolution. The editor might well have presented a brief survey of such materials but did not do so. Nor did he prepare and reproduce a map which would enable the reader to follow the movements of troops more conveniently than he can by reference solely to the two contemporary maps which are reproduced in this volume.

It is understood that the publication of other documents from the von Jungkenn papers is planned. It is to be hoped that these plans will result in other volumes equally as valuable for use by the student of the military history of the American Revolution as this one is.

PHILIP M. HAMER

*The National Archives*

*Mahan: 'The Life and Work of Captain A. T. Mahan U. S. N., by Captain W. D. Puleston. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1939. Pp. 380. \$4.00.)*

It is typical of Mahan's recognition abroad that his first biography, an appreciative and in many ways excellent book published in 1920, should have been by an Englishman, Carlisle Taylor. Yet almost inevitably this first life left much material not fully utilized—family letters and papers, the correspondence over many years with Mahan's friend Samuel Ashe of North Carolina, the exchange of letters with Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary Long, Admiral Luce, his publishers, and many friends abroad, all of which have now been employed to complete what may be regarded as a definitive biography of the distinguished naval historian.

The need for such a biography arises primarily from the fact of Mahan's unquestioned influence on at least two cardinal political developments of his time, the Anglo-German naval rivalry culminating in 1914, and the expansionist movement in our own country before and after the Spanish War. With this latter movement especially, Mahan's connection is now clearly traced in Captain Puleston's volume. And his coincident shift of opinions is also interestingly shown—from an isolationist attitude to that of an expansionist honestly convinced the United States should take up its share of "the white man's burden," and from his early view that a navy existed almost solely for commerce defense to a recognition of its vital importance in defending a nation's place and interests in world affairs.

The extraordinary influence of Mahan is explained partly of course by the timeliness of his chief books, partly by his broad, illuminating interpretation of "sea power," but primarily by the fact that, almost for the first time, he brought a philosophical mind to the interpretation of naval history. Battles and naval operations were no longer studied merely for their narrative interest but with constant emphasis on their broader strategic bearing and effect in furthering na-



tional interests in both peace and war. Only in his *Life of Nelson* and *War of 1812* did Mahan delve deeply into primary sources, but in everything he wrote he stressed the strategic and political importance of naval power. While all this comes out clearly enough in the course of Captain Puleston's book, it might have been well if, even with some shortening of his extended summaries of individual volumes, he had given a concentrated chapter or more to these fundamental questions. What is the general import of Mahan's teaching? How is its influence explained? How far-reaching has been its effect on world affairs? It would also have helped future students if, to the valuable list of Mahan's collected and uncollected publications, there had been added at least a selective list of books and articles about Mahan, revealing his impact upon the thought of his time. Aside from these possible shortcomings, Captain Puleston has supplied an adequate record of a man who, more than most historians or naval officers, helped shape the history of the period in which he lived.

ALLAN WESTCOTT

*United States Naval Academy*

*Military Operations, France and Belgium 1916*, Volume II, by Captain Wilfred Miles. (London & New York: Macmillan & Company Ltd. 1938. Pp. 601. \$4.50.)

The seven published volumes of the British official history of the Great War dealing with operations on the Western Front, including the first volume on the Somme offensive, were prepared by Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds. The completion of the histories dealing with the Gallipoli, Egyptian, Palestine, and Macedonian campaigns has enabled the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence to delegate the remaining volumes on the Western Front series to Captain Miles (1916), Captain Cyril Falls (1917), and General Edmonds (1918). With these additional writers available, it seems possible that the entire British series may be completed before even a single volume of official documents on the A.E.F. is made available for the general public.

This volume maintains the high standard we have come to associate with the British official history series. Captain Miles takes up the depressing tale of the renewal of the offensive after the first day on the Somme and traces each subsequent sanguinary effort to "wear down" the enemy. He admits that surprise was non-existent, that the prospect of continuing a failing offensive did not appeal to many British commanders, that French strategical concepts dominated the British High Command. His fact-studded pages confirm again the well-known futility of the frontal attack on wired and entrenched machine guns. The only relief from the darkening scene presented is the record of dogged gallantry by both German and British troops. Since the German leadership could think in 1916 only in terms of rigid front-line defence, the German infantryman endured the sustained horrors of British artillery fire. While the

brave if ill-trained British troops never hesitated to attempt the impossible even when they recognized their task as such in advance. The Somme was essentially a soldier's battle.

Naturally Captain Miles makes the best possible case for the valiant armies of England, but not many American readers will be inclined to accept all his conclusions. It is asserted in rather torturous language (page 553) that the German losses on the Somme actually exceeded those of the French and British! Apparently certain historians are slow to discount the natural tendency in post-war German military literature—particularly in regimental histories—to magnify the superiority of the enemy, as well as the suffering and achievements of German units. Thus an army whose leaders constantly promised victory was able to explain away ultimate defeat and prepare the morale of the New German armies. If we are asked to discount the depressing statistics of certain British historians on losses in the Somme offensive, we should not be asked (page 555) to credit the post-war special pleading of Ludendorff.

This volume describes the first employment of the tank in modern warfare. It adequately disposes of the idea that Haig should have waited until hundreds of tanks were available before disclosing this surprise weapon. Since the British were unable in 1916 to coordinate artillery and infantry effectively, it is difficult to see how they could have successfully added a third factor to the problem. The tank-by-tank description of the first assault shows that the Mark I Tank had structural and mechanical weaknesses so great that its performance on the Somme battlefield in the fall of 1916 was utterly unpredictable. Like the weapons of the past, the tank had to undergo field tests and its personnel had to be trained for artillery and infantry cooperation before striking successes were to be gained.

In 1916 the British armies on the Somme were in a tragic position. They did not possess men and matériel sufficient to attain a decisive success on the Western Front. Yet they were so large and cumbersome, their material requisites were so enormous, that their sphere of operations was limited to the terrain selected by the French, and they were forced to continue a battle of attrition on a front where all surprise was gone and where all the stakes were minor. It seems rather futile to speak of the Somme offensive as having destroyed the morale of the German forces, when the same armies performed great military feats in the same theatre in the following year and almost upset the whole Entente in the spring of 1918.

Fortunately for the British, the German High Command was very slow to appreciate the full lessons of the Somme battle of matériel. The German elastic defense in depth was first clearly outlined in *Erfahrungen der I. Armee in die Sommeschlacht 1916* which was not drawn up until January 30, 1917. Had the German troops been allowed to fight for the front line and not in it, the British achievements would have been smaller and more costly than they were.

Major A. F. Becke's maps and sketches are as usual extremely helpful. There is a general index as well as an index of arms, formations and units.

H. A. DE WEERD

Denison University

*History of the 135th Aero Squadron, from July 25 to November 11, 1918, by Percival Gray Hart, with illustrations by Edward M. Urband. (Chicago: published by the author. 1939. Pp. 179. \$3.00.)*

This unpretentious book, in paper cover and with illustrations whose principal merit is that they were drawn by one of its heroes, comes near being just what an organizational history should be. Its running account of the World War activities of the 135th Aero Squadron (Observation) is reinforced with extracts from diaries, letters, and accounts written shortly after the events narrated. These almost invariably tell plain, unvarnished stories of thrilling incidents of air service in an altogether admirable matter of fact way. The 135th proves to have been a squadron of authors, headed by an author-in-chief who almost forgets to mention that he won the distinguished service cross.

The Squadron had long service in France and was one of the few of our aviation units to be equipped with American-made planes and the famous Liberty motors. It served through the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations, having five of its officers killed in action, and being credited with the destruction of eight German planes. Few World War books have been more informative on the subject of aviation tactics, all of which is presented in a series of stirring experiences, each terse and pointed, yet containing all needed detail. It should have a much wider circulation than merely as souvenirs for those whose names appear on its roster.

DON RUSSELL

Chicago, Illinois

*Secret and Urgent*, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1939. Pp. 282. \$3.75.)

This is essentially a popular treatment of a highly complex subject—labyrinthine to most of us but fascinating to its captives—a narrative history of codes and ciphers. That the technical side has not suffered by the treatment is evidenced by the favorable notices it has received from reviewers expert in its field. The author himself is an amateur cryptographer of no mean skill and Major D. D. Millikin, whose assistance is acknowledged at the outset, is one of the country's foremost authorities.

That the popular note has not been constrained by the complicated and mathematical qualities of the subject is due to the unique skill of Mr. Pratt. On this score the book is most deserving of praise. It is at once a pleasant, readable history and a clear, logical book of reference.

The general scheme has been to divide the history of codes and ciphers into its obvious chronological periods, each one being assigned a separate section or

chapter. Each of these sections, then, opens with an historical preamble and an elementary discussion of the current cryptographic developments and methods. Each section ends with a technical demonstration and a scientific analysis of the results. So clearly are the two parts divided that it is perfectly possible to omit these technical endings and still gain a substantial picture of the progress of the science.

It is said that this is the only comprehensive book on the subject. Certainly it is the only readable one for the layman. It is well equipped with notes and tables and studded with examples. It shows clearly the need for organized study of cryptography and for far more adequate military codes and ciphers than we apparently possess at the moment.

FREDERICK P. TODD

*The National Archives*

### OTHER RECENT BOOKS

#### 1. United States and Great Britain

*Bombs Bursting in Air: The Influence of Air Power on International Relations*, by George Fielding Elliot. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1939. Pp. 173. \$1.75.) An analysis of airpower and its potentialities in the world today.

*Annapolis Today*, by Kendall Banning. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1938. Pp. 364. \$2.50.) A companion volume to *West Point Today*, mentioned in the JOURNAL, Vol. I, No. 4. A popular handbook of the Naval Academy, it covers the daily life and traditions of the midshipmen through the four years of their training.

*Catigny, a Corner of the War*, by Jeremiah M. Evarts. (Privately printed. 1939. Pp. 96.) Collection of brief sketches, based chiefly on the personal experiences of a captain of the 18th Infantry, A.E.F. Introduction by Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard.

*Historical Register of Virginians in the Revolution, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, 1775-1783*, by John H. Gwathmey, with an introduction by Dr. H. J. Eckenrode. (Richmond, Va.: The Dietz Press. 1938. Pp. 872.) A genealogical register, carefully prepared, which will be of assistance in tracing organizational histories during the Revolution.

*The Coming Struggle for Latin America*, by Carleton Beals. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1938. Pp. 401. \$3.00.)

*Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism*, by Harry R. Rudin. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1938. Pp. 456. \$4.00.) An exhaustive account of the colonization and military administration.

*Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 1848-1894*, by Raymond James Sontag. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company. 1938. Pp. 362. \$3.50.)



*A German Conscript with Napoleon: Jacob Walter's Recollections of the Campaigns of 1806-1807, 1809, and 1812-1813*, edited by Otto Springer. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, Department of Journalism Press. 1938. Pp. 231. \$1.50.)

*Imperial Defense*, by Major General Henry Rowen-Robinson. (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 342. \$3.50.) A handbook on modern warfare.

*The King's Service*, by Ian Hay. (London: Methuen & Company, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 349. \$2.50.) An outline of the part of the British Army in the development of the Empire with accounts of the winning of the battle honors of British regiments.

*Lord Roberts*, by Lieutenant Colonel H. de Watteville. (London: Blackie and Son, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 168. 5s.)

### 2. Western Europe

*Tactique d' Artillerie: Matériels d'Aujourd'hui et de Demain*, by General Frederic Culmann. (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle. 1937. Pp. 786.) Partly a discussion of the place and use of the artillery in France and Germany, 1914-1918, as illustrated by the various battles and campaigns of the World War, and partly a study of the status of artillery at the present time and its use in defensive and offensive operations. The work gives special consideration to the new factors in artillery warfare, such as the motorization of artillery, and the use of tanks.

*Die kleinen Staaten Europas und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges*, by Paul Herre. (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1937. Pp. 517. Rm. 7.90.) An account of the neglected role of the small European states in pre-war and World War diplomacy.

*Das Söldnertum in der Zeit des dreissig jährigen Krieges*, by Eugen von Frauenholz. (Munich: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1938. Pp. 438. Rm. 18.) The third volume in the series "Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens."

*Geschichte des deutschen Heeres seit dem Waffenstillstand, 1918-1938*, by J. Benoist-Méchin. (Berlin: Reimer. Pp. 270. Rm. 7.50.) This is the first volume of the series "Vom Kaiserheer zur Reichswehr" edited by Carl Henke tracing the post war development of the German army.

### 3. Eastern Europe and Asia

*Nauka o voïnie (o sotsiologicheskome izuchenii voïny)* [Science of War (a Sociological Study of War)], by N. N. Golovin. (Berlin. 1938.) The problem of war discussed as a social phenomenon.

*Ot voïna k"m mir* [From War to Peace], by A. Girginov. (Sofia. 1937. Pp. 533.) The political and military history of Bulgaria during 1918.

*Suvorov; ocherk zhizni i deiatel'nosti velikogo polkovoditsa* [Suvorov; a Sketch of the Life and Work of the Great Military Leader], by S. A. Kalinin. (Moscow. 1938. Pp. 86.) A popular account of the life and activity of Suvorov.

- Voïnite prez treto B"lgarsko TŠarstvo—1877-1918. Tom втори: B"lgariâ v Svetovnata voïna 1915-1918* [Wars of the Third Bulgarian Reign. Volume Two: Bulgaria in the World War 1915-1918], by A. Ganchev. (Sofia. 1937. Pp. 191.) The history of the unsuccessful Bulgarian struggle in the Balkan Peninsula by the Colonel of the Bulgarian General Staff.
- Vykhod iz okruzheniâ 19-go Arméiskogo korpusa u Tomashova v 1914 g.* [Breaking through the Double Envelopment of the Austrian Forces by the 19th Army Corps at Tomashov in 1914], by A. Belyi. (Moscow. 1937. Pp. 83.) A minute description of the actions of the 19th Army Corps of the 5th Russian Army, August 27-30, 1914.
- Proryv 54-ï strelkovoi divizii oboronitel'noi polosy belopoliakov* [Breaking through the Defense Line of the Poles by the 54th Infantry Division], by F. A. Khramov. (Moscow. 1938. Pp. 64.) A description of the preparedness of the Soviet troops for this complicated maneuver and an analysis of the Polish defense.
- Izgnanie Napoleona iz Moskvy* [Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow]. (Moscow. 1938). The occupation of Moscow in 1812 and the retreat from Russia based on diaries, memoirs, letters, and other historical documents of the period.
- Operatsii flota protiv berega na Chernom more v 1914-1917 g.* [The Operations of the Fleet against the Coast in the Black Sea in 1914-1917], by N. Novikov. (Moscow. 1937. Pp. 263.) A description of several separate operations.
- Lutskii proryv* [Breaking through at Luck], by M. Rozhdestvenskii. (Moscow. 1938.) An analysis of the causes of the Russian success, June 4, 1916.
- Nastupatel'naia operatsiia 9-i russkoi armii v iunie 1916 g.* [An Advancing Operation of the 9th Russian Army in June 1916], by A. Bazarevskii. (Moscow. 1937.) A description by a participant of the piercing of the Austro-Hungarian front in Southern Galicia and Bukovina.
- Perekop i Chongar; sbornik statei i materialov* [Perekop and Chongar; a Collection of Articles and Materials], edited by A. V. Golubev. (Moscow. 1933. Pp. 79.) The defeat of the remnants of the White Army of General Vrangl in Crimea in 1920.

## RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

### MILITARY HISTORY

- "Salvaging Revolutionary Relics from the York River," by Homer L. Ferguson, in *William and Mary College Quarterly*, July 1939 (2d ser., XIX, 257-71). Résumé of the activities jointly effected by the Mariners Museum and the Colonial National Historical Park, Yorktown, in the reclamation of objects from British warships sunk off Yorktown in 1781.
- "Research into Estonian Military History and the Central State Archives," by H. Sepp, in *Central State Archives, 1932-1937, and Special Archival Questions* (Tartu, 1937), pp. 100-11. General survey of the materials in the Central State Archives of Estonia for the study of military operations in that country from the latter part of the 16th century to the present.

## MILITARY SCIENCE

- "Harbor Defense and Naval Strategy," by Major Bryan L. Milburn, in *Coast Artillery Journal*, May-June 1939 (LXXXII, 204-15). Review of this timely subject in the light of military history with observations on its application to our present needs.
- "Cannae: The Perfect Battle," by Chaplain Edward Barkley Wilcox, in *The Cavalry Journal*, May-June 1939 (XLVIII, 222-32). Brief account of this classic of the classroom with more background than battle.
- "War Letters of Augustus Trowbridge, August 28, 1917 to January 19, 1919," (Part I), with a foreword by Deoch Fulton and introduction by the late Dr. Trowbridge, in *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, August 1939 (XLIII, 591-617). The colorful and intimate correspondence of the scientist who in 1917 organized and headed the Sound Ranging and Flash Ranging Services for the A. E. F.
- "Sampson and Shafter at Santiago," by Commander Louis J. Gulliver, U. S. N., Retired, in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1939 (LXV, 799-806). Heavily documented account of the difficulties involved in joint operations of army and navy forces in war.
- "The Origin of the Armed Merchant Cruiser," by Frank C. Bowen, in *Journal of the Royal Service Institution*, May 1939 (LXXXIV, 320-39).
- "Le problème de l'Unité de Commandement sur le front franco-britannique au début de 1917," by E. Kuntz, in *Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale*, January 1939 (XVII, 19-50).

## INSTITUTIONS

## France

- "Armaments and the French Experiment," by Kimon A. Doukas, in *The American Political Science Review*, April 1939 (XXXIII, 279-91). Recent results of French efforts to nationalize the armaments industry.

## Spain

- "War Without Gold," by Gault Macgowan, in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1939, (XXXI, 167-71). The mystery of Spanish Rebel finance.
- "Proving Ground in Spain," by Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, in *Army Ordnance*, May-June 1939 (XIX, 333-36). A discussion of armament trends as revealed by the Spanish civil war.

## United States

- "Future International Laws of War," Vice Admiral W. L. Rodgers, in *American Journal of International Law*, July 1939 (XXXIII, 441-51). A discussion of the probable rules in the next great war based upon a study of those which have applied before. Conclusion: few rules will apply and those will be open to wide interpretation.
- "The Preservation of Democracy—America's Preparedness," edited by John A. Krout, in *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, May 1939 (XVIII, no. 3 [111 pp.]). Fifteen papers dealing with "Preparedness and Foreign Policy," "The Problems of Physical Preparedness," and "Democracy and the Issue of Preparedness."
- "War in a Mechanistic Civilization," by Major J. Halpin Connolly, in *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1939 (XLVI, 306-13).
- "The Soldier in the Far West, 1848-1860," by A. B. Bender, in *The Pacific Historical Review*, June 1939 (VIII, 159-78). Brief treatment of the living conditions and social life at frontier posts, most of the examples drawn from the Southwest.
- "The Glory of the Soldier," by Major Thomas R. Phillips, in *Infantry Journal*, May-June 1939 (XLVI, 210-21). Some thoughts on the anatomy of discipline and its relation to the American soldier.
- "Mutiny or a Bounty," by Major Charles Winslow Elliott, in *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1939 (XLVI, 314-22). Washington's famous address at Newburgh retold in simple and dramatic fashion.

## ESTABLISHMENTS

## Belgium

- "Les Origines de nos Carabiniers (suite)," by Louis Leconte, in *Carnet de "La Fourragère,"* July 1939 (5th ser., no. 6, 504-50). One of the series entitled "Essays in Belgian Military Folklore," covering the various regiments of the Belgian Army.

*Jugo-Slavia*

"The Military Organization of Yugoslavia," by Captain Gordon Gordon-Smith, in *The Field Artillery Journal*, May-June 1939 (XXIX, 234-40). Brief summary by an officer of the Royal Jugo-Slav Army.

*United States*

"Excavating the Site of Old Fort Ridgely," by G. Hubert Smith, in *Minnesota History*, June 1939 (XX, 146-55). Well illustrated review of archaeological activities at one of our frontier forts.

## OPERATIONS AND BIOGRAPHY

"The Capture of Quebec," with an introduction and notes by Brigadier R. O. Alexander, D. S. O., in *Jour. Soc. Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1939 (XVIII, 135-68). Manuscript journal relating to the operations before Quebec from May 8, 1759, to May 17, 1760, kept by Lieutenant (later Colonel) Malcolm Fraser of the 78th Foot.

"Seventeen Days of Sunset," by Sergeant J. E. Whitehorne, Co. F, 12th Virginia Infantry, C. S. A., in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1939 (XXXI, 182-86). The edited and condensed version of an account kept by a Confederate soldier in his roll book, covering the days April 2-17, 1865.

*World War*

"Blockade in the Great War," by Lt. Commander R. C. M. Duckworth, R. N., in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May 1939 (LXXXIV, 320-39). Account of the work of the "Northern Patrol" of the British fleet in the enforcement of the blockade.

*1919-1939*

"La France en Méditerranée Orientale," by General M. Weygand, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1, 1937 (XXXVIII, 515-36).

"While Czecho-Slovakia was Passing," by Major B. T. Reynolds, Royal Artillery, Retired, in *The Military Engineer*, May-June 1939 (XXXI, 217-22). First hand account of the German occupation by a British observing officer.

"The Capture of Amoy, China, by a Japanese Naval Landing Force," by Commander Allen G. Quynn, U. S. N., in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1939 (LXV, 815-18). Eye witness account by an officer of the U. S. S. *Ashville*.

"The Japanese Campaign in China," by Peter Fleming, in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, May 1939 (LXXXIV, 360-70). Summary of military activities and a brief explanation of upper class Chinese war psychology.

"A New Phase in China," by Lieutenant Jack W. Rudolph, in *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1939 (XLVI, 323-33). Review of the conflict from the fall of Canton and Hankow through the Chinese offensive in the spring of 1939 with an estimate of the situation as it stands today.

## OBJECTS AND ANTIQUITIES

*Weapons*

"Viking Weapons Found near Beadmore, Ontario," by C. T. Currelly, in *Canadian Historical Review*, March 1939 (XX, 4-8).

"Some Criticism of Military Equipment, 1066-1900," by C. Ffoulkes, C. B., O. B. E., F. S. A., in *Jour. Soc. Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1939 (XVIII, 170-76).

"American Pole Arms or Shafted Weapons, with Examples from the Fort Ticonderoga Collection," in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, July 1939 (V, 66-103). A well illustrated general review of the subject, with particular reference to the use of the polearm in North America.

*Uniforms*

"L'Origine de la Blouse de 1830," and "Les Uniformes des Elèves de l'Ecole militaire (suite)," by Louis Leconte, in *Carnet de "La Fourragère"*, July 1939. Two well documented studies of the uniforms of the Belgian Army. M. Leconte is *conservateur en chef* of the Musée royal de l'Armée at Brussels.



# NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

## AMERICAN MILITARY DRESS IN THE WAR OF 1812

### I. Introduction

We are used to thinking of the typical War of 1812 uniform as being something like those drawn by the late H. A. Ogden for his plate for the period 1813-1821 in The Quartermaster General's *The Uniform of the United States Army, 1774-1889*. As a matter of fact the uniforms he drew did not exist. They are conventionalization for which we are chiefly indebted to two artists of the mid-nineteenth century, Felix O. Darley and Alonzo Chappel, who made many historical illustrations from the 1840's to the 1870's.

Darley's illustrations for the War of 1812 are more accurate than Chappel's. However, the leather caps Darley put on his soldiers are the model of 1822, concave sided and pointed at the bottom in back. Chappel's soldiers were more conventionalized and more nearly resemble those of the 1830's than of 1812. His cartridge boxes are the model of 1840 with the oval brass U. S. plate and the long shoulder belt that hung the box far down below the hip bone. His knapsacks are the varied and complicated models of the militia of the 1840's. All this seems strange since there were many veterans still living then whose memories of events and the appearance of things of only forty years before must have been sufficiently vivid to have served as a good source.

Ogden fell into the error of being guided by these two men when he drew the 1813-1821 plate. This is excusable in view of the scant material he was given from which to reconstruct the uniforms, but he added fresh errors of his own. He shows a cap even more incorrect than Darley's, for some unknown reason deciding upon a style—apparently of felt with a leather top, a leather band around the bottom, and leather straps in a V shape on each side—which was never used in the Regular Army. A similar type was prescribed in the regulations of 1832 but never issued as the model of 1834 came in before the supply of leather caps introduced in 1822 was exhausted.

Every illustration of the War of 1812 uniform made after about 1889 can be traced to the Ogden plate, and his conventionalizations will doubtlessly be perpetuated *ad infinitum*. It is hoped, however, that a series of notes and illus-

trations in the JOURNAL may be the means of correcting erroneous impressions in part at least and be the beginning of a scientific study of the history of uniforms in this country. No one, save Ogden, has previously attempted original research in the field, probably because sources are scarce. The existing official regulations are disappointingly meager and lacking in detail, pictorial evidence is almost entirely absent, and physical items in museums are usually mislabelled if exhibited at all. Nevertheless, it is believed that accurate reproductions of the uniforms of the period can be made by carefully piecing together the existing information.

The object of this first section is to present some of the more salient general facts concerning types of uniforms. Subsequent sections will be devoted to more detailed descriptions of the various arms, services, and units. Only the period 1812-1815 will be considered in the present series, but the uniforms of all troops participating in the war, militia as well as the Regulars, will be included.

At the outset several points must be made clear. First of all, the Regular Army was probably at no time consistently uniformed in the sense we understand today. It commenced the war in one variety of dress and ended it in another, between which times it frequently suffered from makeshifts of all sorts. The older organizations and the new Army volunteers often differed in their garb, and the militia, which usually formed the greater part of any military force, bore slight resemblance to the Regulars and normally presented great variety among themselves.

In practice uniform dress was little observed by the ordinary enrolled militia. Returns of these organizations from most states show that only the commissioned and non-commissioned officers were uniformed in accordance with the law. The soldiers wore their civilian clothes supplemented by such equipment as they might own or be hastily issued. Frequently they were mustered into service without arms of any sort.

On the other hand the Volunteer Militia—the light infantry and rifle companies, the grenadiers, horse and foot artillery, and the cavalry—were almost without exception completely uniformed and equipped. These uniforms were for the most part showy, often extremely handsome, and usually harked back to the Revolution for their inspiration instead of towards contemporary Europe as did the clothes of the Regular Army.

Among the uniforms of these Volunteers there was a certain uniformity or at least consistency of color. The infantry, artillery, much of the cavalry, and even some rifle companies had coats and pantaloons of dark blue faced and edged with red. The general officers almost always wore blue coats faced with buff and buff underclothes, and the riflemen generally wore green rifle frocks and trousers trimmed with red or yellow fringe. Another generally accepted style for general officers was the use of leopard skin housings; that some were not above using substitutes for this material is clearly shown by an Albany saddler's advertisement which offers housings of mock leopard as well as the genuine. The grey uniform, so strongly associated with the later National Guard, had not yet arrived.



PHILADELPHIA VOLUNTEER MILITIA, ABOUT 1812

*Illustrating the round hat with trimmings and the older style cutaway coat.*

It is not generally realized that there were three distinct styles of uniform coat existing at the start of the war; first, the old fashioned cutaway with facings, based on the Revolutionary War type; second, a coat of more modern aspect hooked from collar to bottom edge with straight wide facings down each side, based on contemporary European uniforms; and third, a coat of the same general lines as the second but buttoned from collar to bottom edge. The first two styles were worn almost exclusively by the uniformed militia Volunteers though the second was worn by the foot artillery of the Regular Army before 1813. The third had been worn mainly by the Regulars since 1810 but here and there the Volunteers had adopted coats of a similar cut.

The first and second styles required a waistcoat, a necessity with the cutaway as a part of the uniform since it filled up the triangular gap between the waistband of the pantaloons and the one point at which the coat met on the breast. With the second style the waistcoat was necessary in winter to cover the unavoidable gaps between the front edges, which would have made it unserviceable in cold weather, or when the coat was allowed to hang open.


As long as the cutaway coats were worn, close fitting pantaloons were their proper accompaniment. These were, however, beginning to be superseded by trousers in civilian dress, and the change in style was felt by the military or at least that part which served on foot. It is doubtful if simply the inconvenience of the tight pantaloons caused their discontinuance as a good deal of discomfort has always been endured for the sake of style. Moreover experiments with leg coverings of this type prove that they permitted practically as much freedom as the laced breeches of the last war, particularly when they were properly cut to insure this freedom with a very open leg and various other tricks known to the trade.

The wearing of trousers, which became fairly general in 1813, gave an extraordinary ugly effect with the cutaway coats and was no doubt as effective as the trend of fashion in rendering obsolete that antique style. The coat that hooked all the way down was also in the beginning associated with tight pantaloons, but the combination of this style with trousers was not so unpleasant and continued to be worn for many years. The buttoned coat, though first worn with tight pantaloons, had the happy faculty of looking equally well, if not better, with trousers and has consequently lasted longest.

The headdresses worn during the war presented an amazing variety of forms. They ranged from styles which would be judged smart and pleasing today to inventions remarkable for their originality; some were downright fantastic. A peculiar characteristic of the period was the wide use made of paint in the decorating of both the metal and leather parts of the caps and helmets. In general there were four basic types: the chapeau bras, the common or round hat, the cylindrical felt cap or, as we would call it today, shako, and the dome shaped leather cap or helmet.

The chapeau bras (fig. A), a lineal descendant of the old cocked hat, was the headgear of the officer and in addition was considered for some peculiar reason the





FOOT ARTILLERY, REGULAR ARMY, 1812

*Illustrating the chapeau bras and the coat which is hooked in front.*



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, 1812  
*Illustrating the cap and the short, buttoned coat.*

proper headdress for men of the foot artillery. It was worn by such units of the Regular Army and by many of the artillerymen of the eastern states' militia. In the Regular service it was superseded by a felt cap late in 1812, but it continued to be worn by many Volunteers and by almost all higher officers throughout the war.


The common or round hat was adopted from civilian life. It had a crown about 7 inches in height and 7 inches in diameter at the top and a hand-rolled brim which varied from 2 to 3 inches in width according to the taste of the wearer. It was often worn in its original form, with perhaps the addition of a cockade, loop, and feather on the left side (fig. B). In this form it was common in the less brilliantly uniformed militia in the East and in a good proportion of the militia in the West. Sometimes, however, it was altered or dressed up to resemble the more military styles of the day. One method was to add a strip of bear skin over the crown from front to back (fig. C). This made it resemble the leather cap so familiar in British military prints, particularly if a colored turban or band of leopard skin was affixed around the crown above the brim. Giving almost as smart an effect, it had the advantage of being cheaper and more readily procured. A rare form of altered round hat is shown in a contemporary sketch of Philadelphia Volunteers by Svinin. The left side of the brim is increased in width to about 8 inches and turned up against the crown, a strip of bear skin lies over the crown, and a band of leopard skin encircles the bottom (fig. D).

The cylindrical felt cap was nothing but the round hat without a brim. It was of the same materials and blocked over the same or a similar block, but the excess felt, which would ordinarily have been shaped into the brim, was cut off in finishing except in front where a circular piece was left as a peak or visor (fig. E).

The fourth type was the cap or helmet consisting of a dome shaped crown of blocked or jacked leather about 7 inches high with a sloping visor. In its most common form a band or turban of cloth, leopard skin, or fawn skin was placed around the bottom and a strip of bear skin drawn over the top from front to back. It had been a common hat in the French army of the 1790's and was worn by the horse artillery, dragoons, and many of the volunteers in Great Britain (fig. F). In America it was worn in 1812 by the majority of the Volunteer Militia cavalry and some of the Volunteer light infantry and riflemen. Helmets of leather often took on strange and bizarre attachments and decorations. High crests, made of tin or leather and painted in gold or red or some other color, gave almost Grecian lines. Many of the helmets carried metal or leather plates in front painted with some sort of insignia; others trailed long white plumes; and almost all were adorned with feathers, encircled with cloth or hair, and brightly colored. As such, these creations were the property of the wealthier Volunteer cavalry companies, but few ever saw service on the battlefields of the War of 1812.

In the spring of 1813 a cap of a new pattern and made of leather instead of felt was issued to the Army. It strongly resembled the model worn by the British army. The crown was  $7\frac{1}{2}$  inches high, and a round topped front rose 2 inches higher. The diameter of the crown at the top was 7 inches. For trimming it had





**UNITED STATES MILITARY HEADDRESS, 1812-1815**

*A, B, E, and F are the four basic types used during the greater part of the war. C and D are modifications of B. G is the leather cap issued to the foot troops of the Regular Army in 1813.*



a diagonal braided cord, an octagonal or scalloped edged plate, and, on the left side, a small leather cockade and pompon. It differed from the British model in having the top sewed to the top edge of the front as well as to the crown, but toward the end of the war it appears to have been made with the front separate as in the British type. This cap had a flap at the bottom in back which folded up when not in use and could be turned over the back of the neck to shed rain or snow in inclement weather (fig. G).

One article of uniform now thought necessary was, up to the end of the War of 1812, not issued to the foot troops except in emergency. This was the great coat. Troops in those days did not usually undertake winter campaigns, but it was no small problem to furnish the men with some kind of extra covering when they did. They were supposed to keep themselves warm in winter by using their blankets like cloaks, a very difficult feat for men under arms. That they managed somehow is evident from an eye witness account of the surrender of Kentucky troops at the Battle of the River Raisin, where the riflemen are described as wrapped in blankets fastened at the waist by a leather belt. State troops found it necessary to appeal to the public at large or the government for blanket coats or watch coats. Most of the militia had gray or green blankets issued at the rate of two apiece from which to make blanket coats. These were cut so that the blue stripe extended around the bottom edge and were evidently made with hoods as they were also called "capots." They were apparently often made without buttons, the front being crossed over and held closed by a belt like the rifle frocks or a bathrobe. Watch coats were heavy great coats of which a few were issued to each company for guard duty. Many of these were eventually issued to the Regulars for winter service. They no doubt greatly resembled the coat used during the Civil War but had smaller capes and were of heavier materials, being made of gray kersey and lined with the same.


Climatic and physical conditions in the United States were not conducive to great military display. The usual uniform of the Regulars during the summer was the fatigue dress consisting of a waistcoat, or jacket with sleeves, and trousers made of white linen or cotton. Because of poor management of the sources of supply, the Regulars of the 12th and 14th regiments, who were all new recruits, were still wearing these cotton jackets and trousers in October, 1814, and many of them were without shoes or stockings. Jackets and trousers of the same form but made of drab or gray kersey, sometimes twilled, formed the winter uniform. The Volunteers were often more military in appearance than the Regulars as they, having nothing else, were forced by necessity to wear their full dress uniforms. The expense of furnishing a full set of uniforms, arms, and equipment was so great that it discouraged any further luxuries, such as fatigue clothing, among the Volunteer Militia, and consequently odd pieces of civilian clothing were frequently utilized for working about the camps.

### QUERIES

35. ARMS MARKINGS. I have in my possession a Model 1795 Springfield musket, dated 1802. Its stock is stamped MIDDLESEX BRIGADE, running from the trigger guard to the toe of the stock, and also SNY (or perhaps SNJ) opposite the lock plate.

I also have a "Miles CP" musket, which I understand was made by John Miles of Philadelphia in 1797, marked on the stock with SP 67th REGT, running from the trigger guard to the toe of the stock. Can you offer any ideas as to the units by whom these pieces were used?

W. B.



### REPLIES

33. GOLD STAR ARMBAND (III, 136). Early in May, 1918, a mother who had lost her son in service wrote to President Wilson suggesting the official adoption of the gold star as "a badge of honor" to be worn with pride rather than in grief. On May 16 the President forwarded this letter to Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, Chairman of the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense, stating that he doubted whether or not he should at that time make a statement but suggesting that the Woman's Committee "might think it timely and wise to give some advice to the women of the country with regard to mourning." Dr. Shaw reported to him on May 21 that on the previous day her committee had "voted to recommend a three-inch black band, upon which a gilt star may be placed for each member of the family whose life is lost in service, and that the band shall be worn on the left arm." On the following day the President wrote that he approved this action and hoped "that you will be kind enough to make the suggestion of the Committee public with the statement that it has my cordial endorsement." The announcement, together with the President's letter of May 22, was published in the *Official Bulletin* for May 25 (vol. II, no. 319, p. 2).

J. S. D.